Fathom is pleased to present, published for the first time, the diaries of Israeli peace negotiator Yair Hirschfeld. The diaries, which cover the period November 1995 – March 1996, offer an extraordinary insight into one of the most traumatic and seismic eras in Israeli history, and one of the most hopeful and collaborative phases of Israeli-Palestinian negotiation. They are both deeply poignant and highly informative, offering a tantalising glimpse of ‘what might have been’, as well as an assessment of ‘why it was not’.

Editorial Note

Background and Context to the Diaries: The Camp David Accords signed between Egypt, Israel, and the United States in September 1978, defined guidelines for reaching an Israeli-Palestinian understanding. The parties were obliged to negotiate a Palestinian self-government regime over the West Bank and Gaza and conclude an Israel-Palestine Permanent Status Agreement within five years.

In September 1993, Israel and the PLO signed the historic Oslo Accords in Washington DC, defining principles for Palestinian self-government. The framework for this agreement had been hammered out in Oslo, Norway, by two Israeli academics – Ron Pundak and Yair Hirschfeld – and senior PLO official Abu Ala. Thereafter, the Israeli Government and the PLO continued negotiations to define the necessary details, and between 1993 and 2000, 10 further more specific agreements were reached.

During these years, with the support and backing of then Minister of Economy and Planning, Yossi Beilin, Hirschfeld and Pundak sought to prepare understandings for the envisaged Permanent Status Agreement. They met in Stockholm, Sweden, with two other Palestinian negotiators, Ahmed Khalidi and Hussein Agha. Hosted by the Olof Palme Foundation, their meetings took place at the end of the summer of 1994, leading, at the end of October 1995, to the conclusion of what became known as the “Beilin-Abu Mazen Understanding”, or the “Stockholm Process.” The plan allowed provided for 87 per cent of Israeli settlers to be annexed to Israel.

During these negotiations, much of the staff work on the Israeli side was carried out from within the Economic Cooperation Foundation (ECF). That included Boaz Karni (co-founder alongside Hirschfeld), Nimrod Novik, and Gary Sussman, who was responsible for ‘people-to-people’ peacemaking. Uri Savir, the Director General of Israel’s Foreign Ministry, had not been kept informed on an ongoing basis about the Stockholm negotiations, which caused some tension within the Israeli team.

On the Palestinian side, in addition to Abu Ala (who Hirschfeld negotiated with in Oslo) and Hussein Agha and Ahmed Khalidi (who were his interlocutors in Stockholm), were Abu Mazen, Nabil Shaath, Hussein Asfour, and Faisal Husseini, a Palestinian leader from Jerusalem, amongst others.

The below diary entries from Hirschfeld span the beginning of October 1995 – just after the Beilin-Abu Mazen Agreement and before Prime Minister Rabin was assassinated by a right-wing Israeli extremist – until March 1996. At that time, negotiations were ongoing with PLO leader Yasser Arafat and his team – especially over the PLO cancelling clauses in its charter that discussed destroying Israel – as well as with the Syrians over the future of the Golan Heights. After Rabin’s assassination, Shimon Peres became Prime Minister, and the Labor party began preparing for elections (which ultimately took place in May 1996). Hirschfeld also reached out to settler leaders, such as Yisrael Harel, head of the Yesha Council (Yesha is an acronym for Judea, Samaria, and Gaza) and others in order to try to create understandings.

The entries have been lightly edited for readability by Fathom and Hirschfeld. In order to create as smooth a reading experience as possible, where necessary, the editors have also added biographical details within the text and in footnotes for the many names and phrases mentioned.

The entries have been chronologically ordered by Hirschfeld in terms of the days and events that he is describing, rather than purely by date of entry in the diary. This is due to his occasional tendency to recall events in the days after their occurrence. Hirschfeld has also added a postscript, written in January 2025, which reflects on his insights both at the time and now.

4 NOVEMBER 1995

We had turbulent days. The most dramatic day was 31 October, when in the evening we had a meeting with Abu Mazen, Hassan Asfour, Ahmed [Khalidi] and Hussein [Agha]; and on our side Yossi [Beilin], Ron [Pundak], Aviv [Shir, a diplomat and assistant to Beilin, later Ambassador to Austria], and myself. We had decided this was ‘the day’; either we would receive from them a ‘Green Light’ on the text and the map, or we would postpone and probably kill the entire enterprise. In the end we got what we wanted – an ok for the text, and also for the map. It was a long process – we ended our discussion only at 12.30 am on 1 November.

Altogether, everything went like clockwork. At 6 pm, Ron, Boaz, and myself met Yossi in Jerusalem on his way back from Amman and together we went to Tel Aviv. At the ECF office, Hussein and Ahmed were waiting for us, as they wanted a prior meeting with Yossi. Their main concern was what could be done to prevent both them and us being thrown out. Yossi answered, with almost childish openness, that as long as the leadership on both sides accepted our concept and our move to implement it, he would be happy himself and all of us – might well be thrown out of the process. Hussein and Ahmed also asked Yossi to stress the entire negotiating concept to permit Abu Mazen to get a better understanding and basically insist on finalising the matter.

Abu Mazen and Hassan came with me in my car from the Sheraton to the ECF office. On the way, Abu Mazen told me they wanted to discuss matters now and have another month of consultations and only then decide what to do. The discussion itself was led mainly by Yossi, who gave a long overview of the ‘Stockholm Process’ and described in some detail the decision-making mechanism at home. Then came his main argument to reach a major understanding immediately – he had to report (about the agreement) on one hand, while on the other hand the agreement did not oblige the Palestinian side completely; both sides should look at the document as the ‘Document of the Four’ that had no blessing from either side. The only thing Yossi needed was Abu Mazen’s ok – saying the ‘Document of the Four’ could be seen as a basis for negotiations, not more.

The truth was evidently more complicated. First, Yossi himself needed a formula that showed that he had not engaged in negotiations with the Palestinian leadership; second, Palestinian acceptance, even in non-obliging terms, of the ‘Document of the Four’ clearly meant that the Palestinian leadership would go along with it, while any changes on one side would open a Pandora’s box for demands for changes by the other side. Anyhow, the gimmick worked. After agreement on the text, Hassan Asfour (seemingly or apparently) overruled Abu Mazen on this. Abu Mazen agreed that ‘the Four’ should ‘tomorrow’ agree on the map (this however was part of a two hour discussion of the topography of the Ariel and Gush Etzion area). After Yossi had proposed to exclude three of the four Arab villages from the Ariel area, and after Aviv had produced a new idea for the Lod-Modiin area, the expansion eastwards of the Gaza Strip – so toughly demanded before – was dropped.

Since then we have moved relatively fast. The next day we had a long session with Ahmed and Hussein. We agreed on the map and on changes of the text in several areas, whereby we found an excellent formulation – particularly regarding Art. VII (Refugees). In the Palestinians’ internal discussion, Arafat had strongly opposed any endorsement of a policy of tawatin – the integration of Palestinian refugees in their host countries. The fact that the ICPR [International Commission for Palestinian Refugees], rather than the Palestinian government, was supposed to propose it saved face for Hussein and Ahmed. Now they proposed to insert into the text the notion that the State of Palestine was the homeland for all Palestinians – a sentence we could fully endorse, as it stresses that the Right of Return has no meaning within sovereign Israel, or even beyond. Palestinian citizens of the State of Israel may choose to move to the new Palestinian homeland [or remain in Israel]. The text then goes on to state that the Palestinians will support any measure serving the ‘well-being of the refugees’. This could be read negatively, as a kind of perpetuation of the refugee problem, but also positively, namely if it is in the wellbeing of the refugees – tawatin – to stay in the place of their residence, either in the Middle East or overseas. I thought this was an elegant and clear solution.

We also included a short paragraph obliging Israel to look favourably at improving the quality of land to be included in land swaps, where border necessities caused difficulties.

The Swedes were excited about our success, and Sten Andersson [Sweden’s long-time Minister of Foreign Affairs] flew in on the night between November 1 and 2. He told us he had met Arafat in Amman. Arafat had taken Sten aside and thanked him many times for the wonderful work the Swedes had done (always looking carefully that nobody would follow their conversation). When they parted, Arafat, being already several metres away from Sten, sent him several hand kisses, indicating that in essence Arafat was very excited about the outcome and far more positive than had been portrayed to us by Hassan, Hussein and Ahmed, or Abu Mazen.

2 NOVEMBER 1995

Ahmed and Hussein went to Gaza and had a long meeting with Arafat, Abu Mazen, Abu Ala and Hassan. They reported to us only Abu Ala’s reaction. After having read the document and hearing a short report – Pantoffel [a nickname we would use for Abu Ala in Oslo to maintain secrecy] made one remark, saying: ‘we lost 14 months negotiating the Interim-Agreement. You, Ahmed Khalidi and Hussein Agha, have given us these 14 months back again.’ This means that he is fully on board.

Yossi wants to see Shimon on Saturday 11 November. This will be the day. We need a short paper describing the substance and the advantages of the proposed agreement; a list of the settlements to be annexed to Israel, with the number of their inhabitants; a letter from the Swedes; a short paper on a common Israeli-Palestinian approach for Jerusalem, supported by Faisal [Husseini, a Palestinian leader from Jerusalem] and of course a map and a proposal for an Memorandum of Understanding with the Americans.

4 NOVEMBER 1995

[Written in Herzliya before the demonstration] Today a wonderfully great demonstration of Shalom Achshav [Peace Now] is planned. Ruthi and the kids are going there. I am spending the evening with the head of the [German] CSU Faction, Alois Glueck: what a bore, and a pity – I would have loved to be at the demonstration. In the afternoon, I saw Nimrod and reported to him the main developments of last week. He wants me to speak to Moshe Teomim [the head of a GITAM, a Public Relations Firm, and a close personal friend of Peres] in order to consult on the ‘selling method’. I shall ask Yossi. We also discussed Shimon’s possible reaction and the necessity for Yossi to be prepared to hint to him that if he would fail, the possibility of reaching the historic agreement that was now achievable would not remain a secret and his negative role might become known. I hope Yossi will not need to apply such tactics.

I wonder what the impact of the Shalom Achshav demonstration on Peres will be: it should give him courage to go ahead, hopefully. We also discussed Uri Savir. Nimrod did not reject the idea of three of us (Nimrod, Ron and myself) going to him – also about this, he should consult with Moshe Teomim. Maybe it would make even sense to take Yossi with us to Uri on Friday evening and then go and see Shimon thereafter.

9 NOVEMBER 1995

The last words were evidently written several hours before the terrible assassination of Rabin. Ruthi and the kids, who were at the demonstration, told me to wait for them in the Accadia Hotel in Herzliya (where I wrote the last page). On the way back home, Boaz phoned us in the car telling us Rabin had been shot. For almost one hour, we hoped he would possibly return soon back to his work, until Eytan Haber [Rabin’s Press Officer and confidante] made the terrible announcement: Rabin was dead. What a tragedy and what a loss!!!

Everything has changed since Saturday. The reaction of the public in its deep-felt sense of sorrow, of guilt and insecurity is overwhelming. People sense they have lost a father and the theme of father-murder is everywhere present. Also amazing was the international reaction and the Palestinian’s deep shock.

At midnight on the night of 4 November, I phoned Yossi in New York. He told me to get a small team together – Nimrod, Ron, Moshe Teomim and myself – to think what should be the next step.

24 NOVEMBER 1995 (Kennedy Airport)

[This entry relates to events that took place between the 5^th and the 24^th November]. Tomorrow, three weeks will have passed since the murder of Rabin and it feels like ages. I review developments since then according to topics.

The Grief

The shock of the assassination still lasts. I cried several times. The reasons for the great bereavement and grief go deep. The nation has lost a father, a very dominant one. I was struck by his complete devotion to peace – the change of tone and of thinking was particularly evident during the last weeks of his life; remarkable.

I cried again and again for other reasons. The mere circumstances of his death; the mourning of the people of Israel, the Palestinians (I shall describe this more) and the world; the text of shir hashalom [the song he and the crowd sang before the demonstration ended] stained with his blood; the eulogies of [his granddaughter] Noa, of President Clinton, of [King] Hussein, Arafat’s reaction – all this was deeply moving.

I started to sense the great divide in Israel that had caused his death; the depth of the hate of the religious radical right causing the vulnerability of Israeli society and of the peace process. I sensed that centuries-old Jewish suffering had erupted in the mind of a misled youth and misleading rabbis who had legitimised the murder on the grounds of din rodef [1] I learned that Shimon, Yossi, Ron, and myself were on various hate lists Israel Harel [a leading activist in the settler movement] told me that Ron and myself were referred to as machteret Oslo, the Oslo underground.

Most of all I was shaken by the changes – political, social and cultural – that had emerged due to Rabin’s murder. Three days ago (21 November 1995) Leah Rabin referred to them. The people and the nation of Israel understood the need for peace and the need for dialogue and national reconciliation. Rabin’s murder created a new reality, potentially enabling a gigantic leap forward in the peace process. It seemed like God had stage-mastered the peace process, the place and time of the assassination. Shimon referred to it – never before had he seen Rabin as happy and at ease as on that day.

Ron also referred to it. Several weeks ago, Rabin had opened an exhibition in the Tel Aviv Museum on the ‘Sacrifice of Isaac’ [Yitzchak is the Hebrew version of Isaac] and he had said: ‘God spared Isaac – I am not sure, if he will spare me’. Clinton, too, referred to the sacrifice of Isaac and the fact that it was the week when in all synagogues of the world the ‘Sacrifice of Isaac’ was being read. Leah also referred to it.

Knowing of Arafat’s eagerness to conclude an agreement along the lines of the Stockholm document provided us with a great degree of certainty that we could pursue the cause of peace together with the pursuit of national reconciliation, and we possibly had the key in our hands (I hope this is not too optimistic) to pave the way for a Labor victory in the forthcoming elections of end October 1996.

Moreover, we had evidence in our hand to suggest a major breakthrough in the peace process this year – that it made sense not to go to elections now; that there was time now to stabilise the situation, staunch the open wounds, create a policy of reconciliation, and enable Shimon to develop an image of a statesman who thought of the needs of his nation, and not a politician, who only reflected on what was best for his party.

Last Tuesday (November 21) we took Faisal [Husseini] to Leah; he came with his son, with Ziyaad Abu Zayyad [a Palestinian politician who subsequently served as minister in various Palestinian cabinets], Kamal Husseini [a Palestinian businessmen; involved in People-to-People projects] and Rami Nasrallah [a Palestinian peace activist and expert on Jerusalem]; Ron came with [his daughter] Mai and [my son] Yoni was with me. Leah is a remarkable woman, as is Dalia, her daughter. Faisal started out with saying he was paying his condolences and they had come (to see her) in three generations. In the past, Rabin had been the enemy; he had commanded the troops who fought against Faisal’s father Abdel Kader and caused his death; Rabin had fought against Faisal, in the intifada, and had broken the bones of the Palestinians. But he had become a partner in peace. Arafat was shaken by the knowledge that Rabin had gone and could not believe it; Faisal was shaken, too. However, they both wanted to implement Rabin’s will and make peace work.

Faisal – less in words, but more in expression – showed the deep concern of the Palestinians that the peace process may get stuck. He (and others) indicated that for the first time they understood the deep changes and internal struggles in Israeli society.

Leah was outspoken and very impressive. She explained that, for her, shaking Arafat’s hand symbolised the great change and the new reality – whereas shaking Bibi’s hand (she did shake his hand) symbolised nothing but an act of courtesy, of little meaning. Leah and Dalia were mainly concerned with keeping the momentum of peace and trying to direct the good will; with directing the desire to act of the youth and all the others, who so far had been the ‘silent majority’ into constructive action for peace. Leah was deeply insulted by [US journalist and TV presenter] Ted Koppel, who had told her that nothing had changed, and that Rabin’s death had no significance for Israel’s history and society.

As time goes by, the grief for Rabin does not fade, but it is joined by a growing sense of affection. Whether he knew it or not, in Oslo – where all the time, he was all present – without the expulsion of the 418 Hamas people[2] Oslo would probably never had worked, nor would it have without his stubbornness and his support – the mixture of toughness and softness, and determination to stick to his guns and progress towards peace. Evidently enough, he was present in Stockholm too, as Nimrod’s ‘Six Points’ testify. I probably didn’t speak to Rabin for more than half a minute, but somehow he was always present, and seemed and still seems very close.

The Political Moves

I had spoken to Yossi at midnight – less than an hour after Eytan Haber had announced Rabin’s death. Yossi, who was in New York, said he would be back at 3 pm the next day; in the meantime, we – Nimrod, Ron, Moshe Teomim, and myself – should get together to plan the coming days.

In the morning, I opened a workshop on people-to-people peace (the Israeli side), paying tribute to Rabin. From there, I went to see Moshe Teomim. The first issue that came up, already during the night of the murder, was the question of whether the Rabin camp would organise against Shimon. Although Rabin verbally and physically crowned Shimon as his successor during the peace demonstration, Shimon Sheves [the Director General of the Prime Minister’s Office under Rabin] and others – evidently still in shock – were nervous they would be pushed away and become totally irrelevant. Thus, Shimon had to win over Ehud Barak and Haim Ramon [two senior members within the Labor Party] and induce them to postpone their struggle for succession until after the next elections.

The question of whether to go immediately to elections or not was, in Moshe Teomim’s mind, related to all this. He also wanted to keep up the momentum – and therefore argued strongly in favour of going to elections now. Avrum Burg [another senior Labor party politician], who was not in the meeting, took a similar position.

In the evening we saw Yossi. He, on the other hand, was determined to prevent Peres from deciding to go to elections now. To stabilise the situation, heal the wounds, create an image of a national leader and move ahead in the peace process was far more important than to make any dubious gains that anyhow could not be secured in a period of over 100 days. Moshe Teomim argued that in three months the main issue on which elections would be fought could still be on the struggle against violence.

Yossi reported from his first meeting with Shimon, who was shocked about the fact that he too had been targeted for murder. He was cautious and extremely circumspect, and had not yet decided whether to go to elections or not. He wanted to keep matters open, according to the behaviour of the potential coalition partners and the opposition. As a matter of fact, the only issue he was really interested in was how to behave most effectively during the coming hours and days – what to say and not to say publicly, and what messages to give to Clinton and the other leaders who would be coming to the funeral. Yossi and Nimrod decided to assert strong pressure on [Egyptian President] Mubarak to come, and [Egypt’s long-serving Ambassador to Israel] Bassiouni was most helpful in this matter.

Questions that evolved immediately were political and personal. Politically, we had to decide whether to suggest that Peres ‘inform Clinton’ of his intention to move quickly on the Syrian front. Nimrod was strongly in favour; I was against. Nimrod developed a formula that indicated that Israel was willing to withdraw from the entire Golan, but would negotiate and ask for arbitration on where the exact borders were to be. My sense, based on my meetings with Abe Suleyman [a Syrian professor of mathematics who lived in the United States and was a friend of the Assad family], was that a) any strong concession now towards Assad would only encourage further demands, as it would be seen as weakness; b) that now was the time for healing and consensus building, and that while Final Status negotiations with the Palestinians could be combined with national reconciliation, a move towards Syria on the Golan could not. There was no need to do it now. I understood that Nimrod in a way had the upper hand; Shimon told Clinton he was interested to move on the Syrian front.

Another issue that came up was whether or not to encourage Arafat to attend the funeral. He clearly wanted to come. We were unanimously in favour – it made sense to demonstrate Arafat’s sincere grief to the public, to show we were partners in peace and partners in mourning. The funeral also offered an opportunity to get Arafat for the first time to Jerusalem; to come here the second time would then always be easier. Yossi convinced Shimon it was the right thing to do. However, the Shabak vetoed the idea. Being already hysterical due to their failure to defend Rabin, and having to organise in 48 hours the greatest security performance ever staged, they simply panicked and said they could not take the additional burden of having to defend Arafat.

Faisal, whom Ron and myself met on 7 November, was concerned about Shimon’s, Arafat’s and his own security. He argued that the Shabak and the Israeli government had been far too lenient with the extremists. The fact that the Israeli authorities had permitted the followers of Baruch Goldstein [who murdered 29 Palestinians in prayer in Hebron in February 1994] to erect a memorial stone and to organise ceremonies in his honour was indicative enough about the terribly permissive attitude towards the murderous right-wing. Strong measures were needed.

Faisal also asked to be permitted to build 15,000 flats and a soccer stadium in East Jerusalem with the money of Sheykh Zayyid bin Sultan Nahyan from Abu Dhabi. Shimon’s fear of additional acts of violence; Faisal’s fears; our fear for Yossi and indirectly for ourselves – all were fears of another wave of violence that may destroy the peace process for some time to come and cause ongoing destabilisation on both sides. Such fears were very apparent and definitely a common cause of Israeli and Palestinian concern.

I tried to check matters with the help of Motti Arad [a PR expert and policy strategy advisor for politicians]. For the 100 Day team he wrote some rather disturbing papers showing that rabbinical legitimacy had been given to the murder. Rabbi Yoel Bin Nun’s decision to hand over to the authorities the names of those rabbis who had permitted the blood (hituru et damo) of Rabin was on the one hand comforting, but the reaction from the national religious camp was most disturbing. [Rabbi Yoel Bin Nun was a major settlement leader, who after Rabin’s assassination warned that other Rabbis had given instruction (and legitimisation) that Rabin could be murdered], Yoel Bin Nun’s life was threatened, while Yehuda – Dan Kurtzer’s son – who studies in the Yeshiva where Rabbi Bin Nun teaches, told Dan that Rabbi Bin Nun was surrounded by 18 bodyguards and carrying a bullet-proof vest. [Dan Kurtzer was a US diplomat who later served as US ambassador to Egypt and later to Israel].

Almost worse than the death threats of the ideological right, [another leader in the national religious community] Rabbi Druckmann – who like the Bourbons neither learns anything nor forgets anything – forced Rabbi Bin Nun to apologise publicly, threatening him publicly on TV that if he did not apologise, he would be boycotted and excluded (cherem venidui) from his community. Evidently the world was still upside down – good was called evil, and evil pretended to be good.

To my understanding, the major political commandment of the day was to crush the three circles of radical murderous right wing extremism – the small group of those who had and still were conspiring to murder; the number of rabbis – about 18-20 I was told – who legitimised murder; and the much larger group of ideological supporters, the Rabbi Druckmanns and the like. In order to do this, I understood and was convinced that a coalition and a dialogue with the more moderate national religious camp had to be formed.

We had the first meeting of the 100 Day Team on 8 November. In the morning, before going to speak to my son Dudu’s class, I prepared a paper proposing that Peres nominate Rabbi Amital as a minister. As leader of [the moderate / dovish national religious party] Meimad, and head of the biggest Yeshivat Hesder, [in Gush Etzion, in the West Bank] he was accepted as a spiritual leader by the mainstream of the settler movement, and was also considered a man of peace. To permit him to lead the dialogue between the peace camp and the national religious camp and enable him to become a focal point for a political and ideological reorientation of the national-religious camp made much sense to me. Peres very quickly bought the idea, and consequently Rabbi Amital accepted the call – hopefully he will live up to the monumental challenge.

Friday, 10 November I met Israel Harel. I asked Dov Cernobroda [an Israeli peace activist who carried out ongoing dialogue with rabbinical leaders (and later was murdered in a terror attack in a Haifa restaurant)] to arrange the meeting; he did so immediately. At the meeting I asked Israel whether he preferred Dov to stay or to leave, and as Israel suggested we should speak only the two of us, I asked Dov to leave. He will probably never forgive me, but it was an immediate confidence-building effect towards Israel Harel, and thus definitely worth the price. I was quite impressed by both the sincerity and the inherent extremism of Harel. However, my distinct impression was and still is that a dialogue is both possible and necessary.

In the 100 Days Team, and elsewhere, a variety of political questions came up. Yossi’s and my tendency was, from the beginning, that it made sense to create an intense dialogue with the religious parties, rather than include them in the coalition. I also argued that it made sense to look at the historical breach that took place between Mapai and the NRP [National Religious Party] and focus efforts on renewing a dialogue with the National religious camp, rather than the Haredi camp. To buy the Haredi camp off made little sense politically. It did not decrease religious-national violent radicalism; it did not lead the repenting national-religious public back to moderation; it threatened to open doors for old-standing coalition black-mailing and thus would recreate Shimon’s negative image related to the ‘targil massriach’ [the political scandal known as the dirty trick] of February/March 1990; and on top of it, it appeared that a Peres Government – even without the broadening of the coalition – could last until the end of October 1996.

Yossi very quickly identified with this line of thought. The Haredi parties’ behaviour led to the same conclusion. (Unintentionally, I got into a meeting in the Laromme Hotel with [two ultra-Orthodox MKs] Ravitz and Gafni – as they have no legitimacy of their own [because they are obliged to follow the orders of their rabbis] they can only ask for goodies but cannot provide any genuine support in return).

Yossi then started an intense dialogue with the NRP. They presented a 10 Point Programme. The most important point was that the Government would not sign a full new peace agreement before elections. Instead, it may only initial it, and present an agreement to a public referendum in the elections. We had anyhow proposed to act in such a way in Stockholm, as we knew this was the only way Rabin could go along with the Stockholm concept. So, Stockholm was offering a possibility for practical compromise.

In the 100 Day team, Yossi asked to check all issues that could be tackled quickly and efficiently by Shimon. A short discussion was held regarding the law of direct elections of the PM [an electoral system instituted in 1992 in which voters cast two ballots, one for prime minister, the other for a party]. I was convinced it was a mistake now to abolish it. An amendment regarding the need for elections after the death of a PM would make more sense, in order not to give an incentive to further assassinations. We hardly discussed the issue, although the majority present were in favour of changing the law. The decision to maintain the law was taken by Shimon and was evidently necessary. How could Shimon oppose the law? it would appear like a lack of his own confidence in himself to be elected.

The issue that concerned us, both politically and personally, was what would be the nomination game and what positions would Yossi obtain in the new government. All of us dreamed of a possible nomination of Yossi as Minister of Foreign Affairs. On the evening of the announcement in the Central Committee, Boaz told me that he secretly hoped that Peres could do it. Yossi, however, telling me of Shimon’s personal inhibitions regarding him, myself, and Ron (see below) said that he knew from the very beginning he had no chance of getting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Our dream ticket would have been Shimon PM; [Ehud] Barak Minister of Defence, Yossi Minister of Foreign Affairs; [Haim] Ramon Minister of Interior and Vice-PM. I also thought it opportune to give Barak the Ministry of Defence in order to decrease pressure for Shimon: not make him responsible for any future terror act; not make him responsible for being the ‘baddie’ towards the Palestinians; and prevent from him too much pressure to make all kind of concessions. I thought Shimon should build for himself an image of ‘Builder of National Reconciliation’, rather than Rabin’s security image, which anyhow will not successfully stick to him.

However, pressures on Shimon were strong not to give Defence to Barak. Barak had no international experience and therefore could not be the judge and the final power broker for Israel’s most far-reaching security decisions. He had also opposed Oslo A, and might cause serious difficulties in implementing Oslo B. And he could not be relied upon to be loyal to Shimon, and might use the enormous power machine of the Ministry of Defence against him. I definitely did not want Ramon to get Foreign Affairs and Barak Interior. Ramon could be relied upon in the Ministry of Interior to adapt sensible policies towards the Palestinians (particularly for our Jerusalem group, we needed cooperation there).

The real question at hand was – and still is – what will be Yossi’s position. Nimrod prepared a paper suggesting the creation of minhelet shalom – a kind of Ministry for Peace and Negotiations within the Prime Minister’s office. This way Shimon could take a very close control of the peace negotiations, but permit Yossi to obtain ministerial responsibility. Evidently this would give a lot of credence to the Stockholm concept and would enable us to move ahead elsewhere. In order to obtain such a position, Yossi was prepared to give up his position of Minister of Economy and Planning (although he always said that it was a Bonboniere Ministry anyway and as a matter of fact he had turned it into a Mini-Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

The evident difficulty in obtaining such a powerful position was Shimon’s mistrust and grudge against us. Yossi spoke to me several times about it – always one to one– asking me not to mention anything, to Ron, Nimrod, nor anyone else. Matters had got so bad that Yossi had asked Moshe Teomim to interfere and somehow mediate.

Shimon was particularly angry with me. I had given an interview to Maariv and I don’t know what else. Worse, in Stockholm we had ‘given up’ sovereignty over the Jordan Valley and offered 200 km squared of Israeli land to the Palestinians. Shimon’s anger had evidently three parts to it:

1) Rationally, he resented that we in a way pre-empted his decision-making. Having prepared the Stockholm Document, in a way we put him in a no-win situation: would he go along with it? It was us, and not him, who did the work. The old Oslo syndrome was revived. Then, he had seen himself (wrongly!) as messenger boy between us and Rabin; now he might become a rubber stamp for us. On the other hand, if he opposed the Stockholm Concept, history may not forgive him. The achievements obtained were too impressive simply to be ignored or to be rejected.

2) Irrationally, he resented our success and transformed his basically indecent behaviour against us into our rather than his guilt.

3) Undoubtedly, Shimon had also during the last years been steadily fed poisonous remarks by Uri Savir against us. Two days ago, Dan Kurtzer gave me a description of the system. It was enough to say from time to time ‘Yair and Ron have their own agenda’; or ‘Yair and Ron only see the Palestinian point of view’; or ‘Yair and Ron want to preempt your decisions.’ By simply establishing these accusations as ‘accepted facts,’ the devastating effect is achieved. It evidently works.

Apparently, Shimon told Yossi to get rid of Yair and Ron, adding that this would make their cooperation easier. At least this is what I understand from Yossi’s description of their conversation. Yossi fought with all his personal integrity for Stockholm, as well as for himself and me and Ron. In order to check Shimon’s position on Stockholm, Yossi took the paper and said ‘ok let us throw it away’ – getting the hoped for reaction: ‘no, no, keep it for the time being’. (This means that Shimon is aware of the historical importance of the Stockholm Document – it does not mean that he accepts it and that he will go for it.)  In defence of me, Yossi essentially said to Shimon: ‘You got the Nobel Price – they did not get anything, and yet they have continued to serve you (and me) loyally. They (Yair and Ron) are not preempting your decisions, but providing you with essential information and creating policy options that gave you maneuvering capabilities you would not have had otherwise.’ And then Yossi said: ‘I am willing to get rid of Yair, even if he will leave Israel for ever, in case you can find me one single person, who can replace him. Give me one other Yair Hirschfeld and I shall cut off relations.’

I was both shattered and flattered. However, I still don’t know what the outcome of this conflict was. Will Yossi’s power be curtailed or trimmed, because of Stockholm? What does it mean that Uri Savir has been appointed as Chief Negotiator? Will Shimon permit Uri to monopolise the entire peace diplomacy and cut Yossi and myself out? Dan Kurtzer suspects this is happening and indicated that Uri was worse than [American negotiator and Presidential advisor] Dennis Ross, as he is more effective. Or will Yossi be able either to coordinate with Uri Savir or put him in his place, when necessary?  What will our role be? Will we be able to sit with Shimon and develop an effective working relationship? The fact that Rabin is no longer in place necessitates a substantial redefinition of our and of Yossi’s roles. We are no longer twice removed from the final decision-making. Moreover, Shimon, Yossi, and myself have in Palestinian eyes an image of being eager – if not over-eager – to reach an agreement. Rabin, in Oslo and afterwards, acted as a very effective and important buffer. In my view, the need for national reconciliation and the need to coordinate policies with at least a part of the settler movement could recreate the same buffer function.

However, as this is a very delicate game, our tactics of first acting and afterwards consulting may be too dangerous. Thus, a new modus operandi on our side should be developed. It could of course be worked out simply under ‘one on one meetings’ between Shimon and Yossi – and Ron and myself would continue to work closely with Yossi. It may also make sense to speak directly to Shimon, as was the case when we were in Oslo. Anyway, putting away the sense of bad feeling Shimon bears towards us and giving him the sense of full and undivided loyalty and allegiance would make sense. In a way, I am reminded of Ben Gurion who, on the wedding of his nephew, insulted his own brother, causing the family to go to Ben Gurion and apologise [despite Ben Gurion being at fault], in order to mend fences. In a way, as much as Shimon’s personal reaction (to us) is almost unbearable, he still is the Grand Old Man [as Ben Gurion was referred to in later life] and therefore deserves us making every effort to comfort him.

The Struggle for Stockholm and the Development of a Strategy

Before the assassination of Rabin, Yossi had originally decided to first go to Shimon and present the Stockholm Concept to him. The date fixed was November 11 (a Shabbat).

After Rabin’s murder on 4 November, Yossi’s cordial relationship with President Ezer Weizman and Shimon’s most strained relationship with him (due to Weizman’s criticism of Oslo B) allowed Yossi to act as a go-between. In mid-week (either November 7 or 8) Yossi presented the Stockholm Concept to Ezer. His reaction was striking. He said what the agreement achieved on Jerusalem was far better than his dreams. All the other issues, including the idea of territorial compensation, appeared acceptable and even sensible. One important remark was that Rabin had told Ezer that the most important road in the West Bank was the connection between Ben Shemen [in sovereign Israel] and [settlement] Givat Zeev and North Jerusalem and that area had, by hook or by crook, to be part of Israel.

By the way, several days later we went with Elyanor Barzachi [Dean of the school of Architecture at Tel Aviv University and the town-planner of the Jerusalem municipality, who worked on preparing a planning concept for Jerusalem needed for an agreement with the Palestinians] on this road (Road 45) and she explained the central importance of this route to the development of Jerusalem. Thus, Yossi could go and see Shimon already having the support of the president in his pocket. In preparation for the presentation, I tried to get a letter from the Swedes on the refugee question and a page of principles on the planning of Jerusalem. Yossi decided the first was not necessary, and I did not do much to get the second. Altogether the general description of the proposed agreement seemed, at least to me, most impressive.

14 NOVEMBER

[Written on the 14^th, these next two paragraphs in this diary entry refer to events on the 11^th November. After that it refers to the 14^th] Ron, Nimrod, and myself were tense and impatient. It was all down to Yossi now [who was due to discuss the Stockholm Document with PM Peres]. I spent the day mainly swimming, walking, chatting, and eating. Yossi phoned me at Gabi’s place [Gabi Knoll, a family friend], at about 4 pm. He was proud of Shimon; Shimon had listened carefully, he had not made major remarks; he said he would think about it; he would not consult with anyone. He would also not see us, but he would read the text carefully, before moving ahead, either in favour or against. He would consult with King Hussein to check his reactions, and see whether the concept (of establishing a Palestinian State) was acceptable to him. It seemed all rather positive.

Several days later I got rather different story from Yossi, indicating Shimon’s opposition, due more to personal than to political and historical reasons. Yet, Shimon did adopt some of the most basic and logical parts of our strategy concept, not necessarily because he was listening to Yossi, but simply due to the need of the moment.

After the mourning period was over, the Central Committee was convened and Shimon gave a short and brilliant speech. He said ‘I have basically not more than four words to say: Shalom Haver, Toda Haver. This is my message.’ But he added that the main aim of his political behaviour would be to enable everyone to make the utmost contribution. (In practice at the very moment he was saying this, he was planning to do exactly the opposite, at least regarding us). The peace process had to be completed in its first stage during this century – this is to say we had five years, and hence there was no hurry. At first the situation at home had to be consolidated – the political discussion would be led with dignity, respect for the other, and self-restraint.

All this was on the national news at 10 pm that evening. Immediately thereafter I phoned Israel Harel and told him that the Peres speech signaled us sending him signals of goodwill. (I was adapting tactics we had used for years with the Palestinians.) Israel responded very positively and told me on the phone that he had discussed the proposal that a Yesha [an acronym for Yehuda Shomron VeAza, Judea, Samaria and Gaza] settlers’ delegation should meet Shimon and had obtained positive responses – they were putting up a delegation of five and wanted to publicise the meeting. It may be good for both sides.

I told Yossi and asked him to insist I should be permitted to be present at the meeting with Shimon. Altogether, I deserved it. Yehuda Harel from the derekh shlishit [the Third Way] had fucked up the dialogue with Yesha, and I had caught the falling ball and saved it from causing damage. Yossi said there was no way Shimon would permit me to attend – I was anathema to him.

From Yossi’s office in Tel Aviv, I drove to Haifa to participate in a public discussion organised by [theatre in Tel Aviv] Zavta Dov Cernobroda including Prof. Hillel Weiss from Bar Ilan, Moshe Peled from Zomet [right-wing political party], Yael Dayan, and myself. I decided to test the public reactions of the national-religious and the national right-wing towards a strategy that was slowly evolving in my thoughts.

Yael Dayan said some words in memory of Rabin and then, following the request of Moshe Peled, I opened the discussion. I told the story of my sister Ruthie’s death in Vienna one week after the Germans had taken Austria, and the story of the driver in Tel Aviv who would not hurt a Jewish child[3] – saying that the very essence of Zionism and Judaism was to preserve the sanctity of life. The murderous religious right-wing had turned against the central meaning of Zionism and Judaism. This obliged us to draw conclusions, and hence to view national reconciliation as the presently most important aim of our activities. Hence, I proposed a four-point understanding between the peace camp on the one hand and the national and national-religious camp on the other:

Part One was an obligation on each side to take an active and continuing part in the struggle against physical and verbal violence (meaning to take action against the most militant groups);

Part Two was to define strict rules for future political discussion and impose a policy of self-restraint on each side;

Part Three was to cooperate in solidifying the implementation of Oslo B, working together to create a working relationship with all actors;

Part Four was to view the next elections as a popular referendum for Final Status agreements. The government could reach an agreement in principle with the Palestinian Authority but refrain from fully signing it, and. ‘Rak haAm Yachlit’ [a slogan meaning only the people decide]

The discussion showed that my two basic working assumptions had been accurate. Firstly, all four parts were not only acceptable to both the national and the national-religious, but they had no way of opposing them and were thus immediately put on the defensive. Evidently, reminding them steadily of the need to fight physical and verbal violence would continue to put them on the defensive for some time to come. Secondly, the four-point approach apparently tended to stress the common purpose of the right and the left. It seemed that there were only a few minor differences of opinion. Thus, at first sight is created potentially an advantage to the right, who in elections could always claim they were better negotiators and could obtain a ‘better deal’. This, however, created the need for the Labor party to demonstrate its power as a genuine peace-maker and present the public an agreement with the Palestinians, rather than guidelines regarding Israeli demands. In such a way, the public could be induced to choose between a peace proposal that had been agreed upon by the Palestinian leadership, and right wing demands that were apparently unachievable

25 NOVEMBER, 1995 (on board Austrian Airlines)

After having seen the reaction of the right-wing at the Zavta discussion, I put this concept on paper and submitted it to the 100 Day team. Yossi at first refused to distribute my paper, but later on had it translated into Hebrew.

If this strategy concept were to be translated into practical action, it would give us some time. During the coming weeks a main effort could be put on developing a working relationship with Israel Harel, Yesha, and Rabbi Amital, and mediating between them and the Palestinian Authority to create the precedence of effective coexistence on the ground.

At the same time, we could start to launch a public campaign as a trial balloon for the Stockholm concept. [Yitzchak] Frankenthal [an orthodox Jew whose son Arik, was kidnapped and murdered by Hamas and who in 1995 founded the Parents-Circle Families for bereaved Israeli and Palestinian families to work together for peace] appeared in this context like a ‘deus ex machina’. He had prepared a Final Status Plan, permitting the annexation of 80 per cent of the settlers to Israel, and he is looking for financing for a public campaign in favour of his proposal. Like [Former Austrian Chancellor Bruno] Kreisky’s tactics of launching trial balloon ideas – drawing upon them all the possible criticism, inducing the opposition to get rid of all their ammunition, and afterwards preparing a more balanced and well-argued proposal – could we use the Frankenthal Concept to prepare the public ground for Stockholm? For this strategy to work, we needed three other components:

a) Maintaining within the Israeli decision-making machinery a position that would permit us to control, monitor, and direct ongoing events and adapt our actions to emerging needs of either side;

b) Preventing Shimon from taking initiatives that would lead the government on a totally different path from which there would be no return;

c) Guaranteeing the goodwill and confidence of the Palestinian decision-makers in our capability to lead towards negotiations that would be directed at a Stockholm – plus-minus – Concept.

It appears that for the time being, all three conditions are wanting. Within the Israeli decision-making machinery, we have already lost two battles and probably even more. Shimon has now clearly rejected the Stockholm proposal and told Yossi (so I understand) that he would not even consider it for discussion. Shimon has also shown the document to Avi Gil [a career diplomat who became a close aide to Peres], and he has rejected it too, for reasons I still do not understand. On top of that, Uri Savir has been appointed chief negotiator and I am not sure what position he will take.

Ron wants to go to Savir and discuss our concept with him. Maybe it is not a bad idea, if only for the simple reason that it is better that we should present our ideas and proposed strategies, rather than let them be interpreted in a more hostile manner.

Of course, I do not exclude personal power positioning. Dan Kurtzer recently told me (22 November 1995) that Uri had played a major role in isolating him, simply by repeatedly making two remarks, namely that Dan K. was supposedly ‘pro-Palestinian’ and had ‘his own agenda’. Evidently this has also been what Uri was telling Shimon about us. My fear is that Uri and Avi will evade a discussion with us – another reason we should seek it; simply to ask and think together with Yossi and with them, where they think our input could be useful, so as to get a better understanding of what policies Shimon and they will pursue.

The second condition – that Shimon will not take opposing initiatives – appears unachievable presently. Shimon is moving fast on the Syrian track, although he told Dennis Ross that he will not lose the Golan and also lose the elections. Judging from what I read from Syria and what I heard three days ago (November 22, 95) from Abe Suleyman, who just returned from Damascus, Assad is not really ready for peace. The Syrians, so Abe reported, view Rabin’s assassination as an American move to pressure Israel towards the necessary concessions towards Syria. If they really have such a sick mind they will not be able to take the necessary decisions that would make peace possible.

Thus, Shimon may move first on the Syrian track and get us easily into a blind alley, from which it will be difficult to get out. On the one hand, it will be necessary to speak publicly of his willingness to make far-reaching territorial concessions, which may easily get him the worst of all possible public reactions. Also, the Syrians, being upbeat about forthcoming concessions, will ask for more and more and will not finalise anything. On the other hand, the Israeli public will be mobilised (against the concessions) and shown that internal division is as great as ever before. Worst of all, after a failure of an Israeli peace initiative towards Syria, the government will have undermined the possible confidence of the public, and be in a very uncomfortable situation to launch a major peace initiative regarding final status with the Palestinians. Shimon will not have built an image as the statesman who led the way to national reconciliation, but will be seen as a tactician too eager to obtain a quick success on account of Israel’s national interest.

Similarly, it will not be easy to maintain the good will and the confidence of the Palestinians. Nimrod’s undisciplined early remarks to Hassan Asfour were of no great help. Hussein, Ahmed, and Hassan are getting impatient, understandably enough. If we cannot come up with a coherent concept and strategy, and if it will be seen that Shimon, Avi, and Uri are as a matter of fact isolating Yossi, myself and Ron, we will quickly lose ground that will not be easily regained, whatever may happen afterwards.

Thus the outlook, seen from the perspective of today, is rather gloomy.

True, as a matter of substance (not psychologically), we have time. We can tell the Palestinians that not much could or should be done before their elections on 20 January 1996. We can tell the Palestinians that our attention is presently legitimately directed at national reconciliation and at checking prospects of peace with Syria. We can also tell them that we have to now start to develop a working relationship (along with them) with the settler movement and that to move ahead on Final Status we have to launch the ‘Frankenthal trial balloon’. All this makes sense and is plausible, as long as we are not visibly cut out of the game by Shimon, Avi, and Uri.

In practice, we may have the means to continue. Israel Harel will apparently be interested in a practical dialogue with Yossi and Shimon and has all reasons in the world to offer his support. [Jewish philanthropist] Martin Bunzl is most willing to allocate his $100,000, and raise another $150,000, from his family for an intelligent Frankenthal campaign. We might be able to convince Leah and/or Dalia Rabin to support a Frankenthal campaign, in case the memory of Rabin will do the job of presenting the plan to the public, while adjustments along the lines of Rabin’s political testament will be necessary.

We evidently can start an intense political dialogue with Ramon and Barak. Then we have to see how all the other activities of ECF will fit into an intense working programme: People-to-People Peace, and support for Economic Development and Cooperation on bilateral, trilateral and quadrilateral basis. 

7 DECEMBER 1995 (Vienna Airport on the way to Stockholm)

The Quadrilateral Approach

Yossi’s two major foreign political goals are: first, to lead the way towards a Final Status Agreement with the Palestinians as soon as possible; and second, to create the nucleus of an economic Benelux with Jordan and the Palestinians. Since our last visit to Arafat (with Patricia and Lacina) we know that Arafat insists on the quadrilateral approach – i.e. to include Egypt. [Patricia Kahane, the daughter of Karl Kahane and Austrian Jewish businessmen and a close friend of Chancellor Dr. Bruno Kreisky & Ferdinand Lacina, an Austrian politician who served as chef de cabinet of Kreisky and later as Austria’s Minister of Finance for many years]. In Amman, Yossi laid the foundations with Pronk, the Dutch Minister of Economic Assistance, for the creation of the quadrilateral Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian-Egyptian working group.  The meeting of the Ministers (of the four countries) was agreed for early February 1996 in The Hague.

8 DECEMBER 1995 (Flughafen Frankfurt)

The entire connection with the Netherland’s Minister of Development, Pronk is in many ways my doing. First of all, the [Dutch] Clingendael think tank’s concept of trilateral working groups – Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian – drew Dutch attention to the issue and created the desire among them to sponsor the Middle Eastern ‘Benelux’ connection. It took my intervention to arrange for the meeting in Amman with Yossi and the follow-up meetings in Jerusalem.

Our trilateral working group on Industrial Cooperation and Financial Cooperation also relates to the same issues, whereas the quadrilateral concept emerged in the meeting with Arafat. The mechanism of the quadrilateral group dynamics is very interesting, if it were to be played intelligently by our side. The Palestinians and Jordanians tend to be supportive, as they sense that the tri- and quadrilateral frameworks should be used first and foremost to provide economic support to the Palestinians. It becomes a win-win situation nobody can oppose. Together with Dutch, German, and Swedish assistance, it should be possible to establish a working Secretariat of the Four, to plan and oversee different projects. Again here, the Mapai approach of creating facts on the ground rather than obtaining a political ‘ok’ and institutionalising matters appears to be the right approach.

Next week, Wallenberg, [Swedish business magnate] and Pierre Schorri [leading Swedish politician] will come to Israel – maybe we can develop some practical moves with them.

The People to People Approach

With the help of the Norwegians and Georg Fischer [a friend who served in the Austrian Ministry of Finance in charge of health and social affairs and for one year assisted the work of ECF in Tel Aviv], and in cooperation with Hikmat Ajouri and Fathi Arafat, we are developing a structure to support the ‘people-to-people’ concept [Fathi – Arafat’s brother, and Hikmat were Palestinian physicians who worked at the Palestine Council of Health and were involved in People-to-People projects.] We already organised two workshops and Gary Sussman and Georg Fischer are actively preparing various projects with relevant Israel and Palestinian partner organisations which we shall take to the European Union in Brussels, and to the United Nations.

We had a useful, and somehow both constructive and slightly hostile, talk with [Norwegian diplomat] Muna Yuul on the conditions of the necessary framework-structure. She argues that the people-to-people process must be directed and coordinated by Uri Savir and Abu Ala. I was in a difficult position to argue, as I may be suspected of having a personal agenda to settle, [by seeking to overrule Uri Savir]. But in substance the Norwegian position is definitely self-defeating: the main purpose of the people-to-people approach is to create coordinated Israeli-Palestinian activities that will NOT be controlled by either government. Muna also outlined that if ECF and PHC [the Palestine Health Council] created a framework structure for people-to-people, it could not obtain a monopoly. She is definitely right there. We discussed other issues, such as how to finance the people-to-people projects – whether from budgets earmarked for the Palestinians anyway, or otherwise; we did not reach a conclusion.

On the ground, Gary, Daniel Levy [who also worked at ECF] and Georg are doing wonderful work. On health matters we have a well- functioning work group led by Yael Davidson and assisted by Michael Silbermann (Gadi Gilbar’s brother) [Yael, a public health expert, and Michael, a physician, were involved in in People-to-People projects.] In other affairs – women, youths, artists, trade unions – they are developing lovely project proposals. We hope to obtain funding and political support.

Altogether, if we succeed in creating a permanent working structure for tri- and quadrilateral economic cooperation, and a parallel working structure for people-to-people peace, it may either totally institutionalise ECF or, what is more likely, outlive ECF and create new structures that will make ECF superfluous. In both spheres, the quadrilateral Benelux plan endeavour and the people-to-people, it is of great importance to have a non-governmental element pushing and influencing affairs.

In economic affairs, it is also important that the Industrialist Association or the Chambers of Commerce (the Poppers and the Gillermans)[4] will be neutralised and that their self-interest and inbuilt short-sightedness will not be able to destroy these endeavours.

The Stockholm Meeting – 7 December 1995

It was very pleasant to see Hussein and Ahmed again; they have become real friends. We gave them a long report of: a) the evolving political situation at home; and b) the development of Israel’s peace moves; and c) of our work.

The basic message they had to give us was that the more time passed the more difficult it was to maintain confidence (theirs and ours) with Arafat and Abu Mazen. We were in many ways giving them the opposite message: the more time passed, and the closer we got to the elections in Israel, the greater the practical pressure on Peres to move toward an understanding along the lines of the Stockholm document. I added that I thought an understanding in principle, containing two rather than twenty pages, would be more likely and more appropriate. They had no difficulty with that. We would prepare a two-page Memorandum of Understanding.

The next point that came up was peace with Syria and its relationship to peacemaking with the Palestinians. Ahmed and Hussein were impressed by the way I presented Peres’ position on peace with Syria (let us make the ultimate sacrifice for comprehensive peace, but let us first check what comprehensive peace will be all about). They said they understood: a) that Peres was right to go for peace with Syria; b) that he was evidently exposed to pressures from the US and ‘his Arab friends’. What was irritating was that if an agreement with Syria were to be achieved, it would become far more difficult for Arafat to accept the Stockholm compromise (for obvious reasons: why should he accept territorial compromise and the maintenance of settlements, when Assad got all of this?) [all = 100% of the contested territory].

Thus, in a way, the meeting with Hussein and Ahmed turned my mood from bad to worse, as I see that Shimon and Uri will, before doing something constructive, tend to destroy the Stockholm Understanding for personal as well as imagined reasons of negotiating tactics. It may cause great harm to the entire work of ECF and negotiations with Syria will fail.

16 DECEMBER 1995 – Intercontinental Hotel, Amman

On 11 December, Yossi, Ron and I had breakfast with [Swedish diplomats] Sten Andersson, Pierre Schorri, and Anne Dismorr. Then we had a meeting with Bassma [Kodmany Darvish, the daughter of a former Syrian Ambassador to France], who worked on the Palestinian refugee issue, demanding ‘the right for integration’, or tawatin and Assad Abdel Rahman [who was in charge of refugee affairs and also headed the Palestine Authority’s Higher Council for Refugee Camps until his resignation in July 2000] We discussed the refugee work group.

Lunch was with [Swedish business magnate] Mr. Wallenberg. His group of companies has an annual turnover of $74 billion. The lunch was rather frustrating, although I finalised three issues with him. He would send two or three experts to work on infrastructure and energy: one for industrial investment (in the industrial parks); and one for tourism. We would get his people in touch with PADICO (Palestine Development and Investment Company) and also give them material on possibilities for industrial exports to the US and Europe.

The same evening Wallenberg went to see Arafat and had a good meeting with him and promised to look seriously into the matter of the industrial parks.

Two days later, on 14 December, we had breakfast again with Pierre Schorri, discussed the refugee group with [Palestinian political scientist] Assad Abdel Rahman, and were promised support for this work group. On 13 December, we had a Primary Health workshop. Palestinian healthworkers from Tubas, Salfit, Jenin, Tulqarem and Nablus attended. A one-year programme for lectures and workshops was agreed and the decision was taken to establish a Mother-Child Centre in Tobas as a pilot.

25 DECEMBER 1995 – Ramat Yishai

Ruthi, Michali, Naomi, Yonatan [Hirschfeld], and I went to Jordan. [The taxi driver] Shabtai took us to the border at Sheikh Hussein, and [Palestinian economist who worked on economic projects] Rateb Amro was already waiting for us on the Jordanian side. Going southward along the Jordan Valley was an experience: the beauty of the landscape and the poverty of the villages and the people. The many road barricades created a very different picture from my earlier visit to Jordan, when Ron and I had been the guests of Crown Prince Hassan, and we were driven around with a car, carrying the crown as a number-shield. Awkwardly enough, I had to show my Israeli passport several times as, due to my beard, I was at first sight taken for a Muslim sheikh.

In the evening, I met Hussein, who had postponed his departure in order to see me. He had much to tell me:

1. Arafat and the Palestinian leadership in Gaza and the West Bank were presently fully occupied with themselves and the elections. They had neither time nor capacity to think of other things beyond the elections. They were happy with the positions taken by Israel and by Shimon Peres in particular regarding the implementation of Oslo B.
2. After Peres had told Arafat in their first meeting at Erez that final status issues will have to wait until after the elections, Uri Savir told Abu Ala that our paper [the Stockholm Document] was ‘terrible’; that he intended to start work from scratch at the beginning of May 1996; and that on Jerusalem the Palestinians should not expect any concessions, whatsoever. Hussein was clearly upset. His fear was that Shimon’s strategy of pleasing Arafat on the ground in the short term, in order to postpone important strategic discussions, mightwork to the disadvantage of both sides.
3. Hussein also reported about the talks he had had with Israeli experts at the Petra-Amman Conference on Strategic Issues [such as policy analysts] (Uzi Arad, Zeev Schiff and Ehud Yaari etc.). They told him that Shimon would develop the image of Rabin as a holy martyr, but at the same time would do everything to push aside Rabin’s strategic vision of a Middle East in peace.
4. Hussein then told me of the developments of the Palestinian-Settlers dialogue. Hassan Asfour had met [settler leaders] Israel Harel and Eliezer Waldman. He had asked the settlers to state publicly that they supported the Palestinian elections. They rejected this demand, yet Eliezer published an article in Nekuda, saying the settlers had to cooperate with the Palestinian Authority. The settlers and the Palestinians continued their dialogue, and had set the next meeting for 28 December.[5]

Basically, we parted without any conclusion. Hussein, however, had given me something to think about: we should inform them what our desiderata would be, and what input should Arafat or Abu Mazen make to the equation.

The same day, I had been on the phone all morning, trying to pacify Israel Harel. Yossi had promised him he would attend the three years memory meeting for Zvi Klein, a settler from Ofra, who had been murdered on the eve of the first day of Hanukkah in 1992. I pressed Yossi very hard to accept and go there, although Orit, [Orit Shani, Yossi’s chief secretary, who controlled his daily schedule], was very upset about it.

Altogether, the discussion that was going on in the National-Religious camp was quite astounding. Rabbi Yoel Bin Nun had come out with a statement saying that basic decisions in history were made by God, as was the decision to establish the State (medinat yisrael). Therefore Medinat Yisrael was more important than maintaining the unity of Eretz Yisrael; hence the settler movement had to go with the peace process led by the government rather than oppose it. Altogether, Eliezer Waldman’s article saying the settlers had to cooperate with the Palestinian Authority went less far, but in the same direction.

Yossi finally went to Ofra (on 18 December 1995) and it was a big success. In a way, he is now being celebrated as the politician who speaks the truth and at the same time offers a workable solution to everybody. Thus, with all our difficulties, the Stockholm Concept can still and will remain enormously powerful.

7 JANUARY 1996 (On train to Brussels)

The last meeting in Amman with Hussein turned out to be very useful. I got the sense that in him and Ahmed we had real partners and friends, and that they, more than Abu Ala, had the full backing of Arafat and Abu Mazen. I also got the sense that we then had an important amount of good will, as well as time, to sustain this evolving relationship. The main conclusion of our meeting had been to prepare a one-on-one meeting between Yossi and Abu Mazen.

I checked with Hussein whether he could come to the meeting with Abu Mazen, but he said he could not. I decided to fly to Cyprus for us to prepare everything necessary for the Yossi-Abu Mazen encounter. On 26 December, we discussed this with Yossi. He had confronted Uri on what Uri had reportedly said to Abu Ala, [that the Stockholm Document was “terrible”] and Uri clearly denied it. (I checked it in Cyprus with Hussein, who insisted on his version). Uri claimed he had told Abu Ala that he was not allowed to know anything about the Stockholm Document and hence Abu Ala should accept it. Anyway, the important part of the story was that Yossi made it clear to Uri that we knew – and we would know in the future – what Uri was saying privately or otherwise to Abu Ala.

Yossi also came up with another idea, namely to check with Abu Mazen (the Father) whether they could coordinate a public campaign – each side building his part of the Stockholm Document, permitting the public to understand that a common concept had been developed. Obviously, a timetable had to be worked out. 15 April (more or less) would be the [Labor party] primaries – I thought that for them it was important to demonstrate that Yossi had not simply moved to the right, but was actually following a policy that enabled final status to take off, while simultaneously developing a dialogue with the right wing – the settlers.

Hopefully, shortly before the primaries we would get the abolition of the (Palestinian) Covenant – we could then look to change the platform of the ILP [Israeli Labor party] for the next elections; eliminating the present negation of a Palestinian State, in case the necessary Israeli conditions could be met.

I flew to Cyprus the night of 27 December 1995. I had a whole day with Hussein, who was staying in a lovely hotel on the beach. He reiterated his fear that the passing of a lot of time would decrease the Palestinian belief in the validity of the Stockholm approach. Negotiating and research teams, he said, would start to work, and constantly cause the increase of Palestinian demands, thus actually forcing Arafat ‘to climb high up on a tree’ from where it would take again a lot of time ‘to get him down again’. (In the meeting between Abu Mazen and Yossi from the on 2 January 1996, and now here in Holland, I got a taste of the accuracy of Hussein’s description on the workings of Palestinian politics).

We discussed the Palestinian position regarding the abolition of the Covenant. Hussein said that Arafat knew he had to do it, but he could do it quicker or slower (I thought to myself – he might quote Shimon saying ‘there are no holy dates’). Evidently, Hussein argued that an understanding that there would be a Palestinian state would give him sufficient self-consciousness to move ahead quickly. I explained that whatever Shimon’s real personal position would be – even if he were fully in favor of the Stockholm Document – he would maintain an ambiguous position, most probably for tactical reasons, leaving Arafat in doubt whether he might go along with it or not.

Ultimately, Hussein accepted my argument and agreed to form a working group on the abolition of the Covenant (if Shimon would let us work on it).

We then discussed, in quite some detail, Yossi’s idea to build public awareness of a possible Final Status Agreement. Hussein was at first rather skeptical, saying that whatever the Palestinians would say would hurt us; and he actually might be right. Nevertheless, we discussed some of the proposed formulas. They could say that:

1. There will be a Palestinian state, alongside Israel;
2. They will ask for control over ‘Arab Jerusalem’;
3. The state will be a state for all Palestinians and the refugee problem will be completely solved;
4. The settlers are welcome to stay in a Palestinian state;
5. Border adjustments are possible.

Hussein and I discussed, also at quite some length, in-depth negotiations with Syria and their regional implications. His basic message was of the regional implications – be careful [if you decide] to move first on Syria, without having finalised matters with Arafat, as afterwards it may be difficult for Arafat to pay the necessary price[6] [Hirschfeld was convinced that negotiations with Syria [especially before Israeli elections] was setting Peres up for failure [with Syria]. Moreover, try to envisage what King Hussein’s role will be – evidently the entire architecture of the Middle East will come up and will have to be molded in an intense US-Egyptian-Saudi dialogue that will have to be accompanied by a US-Israeli dialogue etc.

After Cyprus I gave Yossi my report which we discussed the day before. The interesting piece of information was that Shimon had authorised Yossi’s meeting with Abu Mazen and given him a green light to discuss the necessary moves in quite some detail. Moreover, Shimon had also given Yossi a green light to start to look into how to annul the Covenant in discussions with them. Evidently Shimon is understanding the ‘goodies’ the Stockholm concept provides.

At about the same time (some days earlier) I was invited to dinner with Martin Indyk [the US Ambassador to Israel], in honour of Dan Kurtzer. Indyk, like Hussein and me was aware of the regional implications of a deal with Syria[7] gave us the same message.

Everybody discussed Yossi’s visit to [the West Bank settlement of] Ofra, and his statements on the settlers and settlements. [Journalist and expert on security affairs] Zeev Schiff argued that Yossi should not: first talk about necessary border changes, and obtain the settlers agreement, and only then go to the Palestinians to negotiate. [Rather] Yossi should do exactly the reverse: first come to an agreement with the Palestinians and only thereafter propagate the idea with the settlers. I almost had a heart attack when he said this, and kept away from Palestinian-Israeli affairs the entire evening. Martin Indyk was quite charming.

8 January 1996 – Brussels

The meeting between Yossi and Abu Mazen was quite a success. First they met for over half an hour, one-to-one. Yossi told us afterwards that he had said three major things to Abu Mazen regarding Stockholm:

First, the Stockholm Document was the only ‘agreed upon’ paper on the table that both leaderships were aware of. No side could ignore it; thus it would be, in one way or the other, a basis for negotiations, although the outcome of negotiations might be quite different.

Second, that Shimon had particular [political] difficulties with two issues: an [agreed temporary] Israeli presence in the Jordan Valley and [compromises on] Jerusalem.[8]

Third, both Yossi and Abu Mazen should (and could) prepare the public for such a kind of final status understanding.

After half an hour, Hassan Asfour, Ron, and myself joined them. We then discussed the cancellation of the Covenant. Yossi suggested (on behalf of Shimon) that all members of the PNC would come back [from Tunis]. Abu Mazen was quite shocked, asking if Yossi really meant this, as this entailed permitting people like [head of the terrorist PFLP group] Jibril etc. to come in. They, on their part, were strongly in favour, and wanted them to stay [in Gaza] for some months before finally convening the PNC. It was also suggested that the Palestinians should not annul the Covenant, but rather promulgate a new one, thereby making it clear that the new Covenant superseded the old one.

Yossi also reported about the ongoing talks with Syria. The major change was a matter of atmosphere, Yossi saying literally that the standard of friendliness and openness created by the Palestinians in negotiations with us was finally accepted and adopted by the Syrians.

While we were speaking, Orit came in, telling us that a journalist was waiting outside. After a short discussion it was decided that Yossi and Abu Mazen would speak to him and tell him that Yossi was briefing Abu Mazen on the development of negotiations with the Syrians. It came out lovely. After Ehud Barak had briefed Mubarak [about the Syrian track], Yossi was now briefing Abu Mazen – hence, it was fully accepted in the most natural manner possible, without the journalist asking any further questions and without getting into any dangerous speculations.

Abu Mazen asked Yossi whether the Stockholm Group could continue to look at various details of the final status issues. Yossi’s answer was a clear ‘yes’.

I checked with Abu Mazen and Hassan Asfour whether they were willing to create a Settler-Palestinian people-to-people programme, referring to a talk I had with Israel Harel the very same day[9]. Hassan Asfour’s reaction was: ‘for you it is good, for us it is bad’. From their perspective, his position was quite rational. On the other issues, particularly the Covenant, Hassan adopted a very hard-line approach, telling us in a very affirmative manner that ‘it was not important for Israel, whether the Covenant was annulled’ and hence the Palestinians had no need to make such an effort.

This was – in real time and life – what Hussein had talked [and warned] about, both in Amman and in Cyprus: Hassan Asfour, in order to strengthen his own position vis-à-vis Abu Mazen, would repeatedly adopt an often irrationally hardline approach – therefore it was of such imminent importance for Ahmed and Hussein to be present, in order to neutralise the effects of Hassan’s personal political maneuvering.

Shortly before the meeting with Abu Mazen, I met Israel Harel in the Laromme Hotel. He complained bitterly about Yossi, Orit, and Aviv constantly putting off meeting him, and said that either we would have a meeting as scheduled – Sunday 7 January – or it would be the end of the dialogue. The settlers had cancelled a meeting with Shimon the other day (Peres had agreed to meet them) as they did not want to give him the photo opportunity without getting something in return. With Yossi, they wanted the dialogue without the photo opportunity and even without getting something substantial in return. As already said, Israel H. was fascinated by the people-to-people approach.

After the meeting with Abu Mazen, and after having received a report from Yossi on his one-to-one meeting, we – Yossi, Ron, Aviv and myself – discussed whether to go ahead with the meeting with [settler leaders] Harel, Zambish, and Eliezer Waldman on Sunday. I was fervently in favour, saying we had a major impact on their internal discussions and we got substantial payback by being seen publicly as the force that brought about internal reconciliation. Ron and Aviv opposed my approach, saying we had nothing to give them; and anyhow they would not create difficulties; nor would they be instrumental for whether the NRP [National Religious Party] would join the government. I argued that any discontinuation of the dialogue with them would naturally harden their position and drive them into an actively oppositional role. Yossi, listening to both positions, took my side, and decided to keep the meeting on Sunday.

Ron yesterday gave me a detailed report about the meeting on the phone (I was on my way to Brussels). The get-together was very friendly. Aviv gave an expose about the Government’s position on the various issues they had raised in their paper and indicated that some small confidence building measures (e.g. regarding ambulance services) were contemplated. Yossi gave a description of his personal position and of government policies. He had not been appointed to take care of settler affairs, and if he had been, it would not be good for them, as he opposed any building or expansion activities and wanted to permit smooth progress towards final status. Israel Harel apparently did not get the logic of this position, so that Zambish had to elaborate. Anyhow, they asked to continue the dialogue and invited Yossi, Ron, and myself to a closed seminar of the settlers at the end of the month.

We also moved ahead on two other final status issues: refugees and Jerusalem. We received a terrible paper from Raanan Weitz [a regional planner who was highly respected within the Labor party]. He wanted to plan for the return of 600,000 Palestinian refugees – 300,000 from Jordan; 300,000 from Lebanon and elsewhere. He wanted to establish [Palestinian] maabarot [absorption centers for refugees on their way to more permanent housing] and start public work activities. He wanted to divert the Litani water for the Palestinians, to establish al-Quds in the Judean desert, and establish Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan River area. We said that under such premises we could not work together with them and insisted they prepare another paper with new guidelines more acceptable to us. Wait and see – we still could give part of the work to them, and part to other researchers, and thus maintain more control. From Assad Abdel Rahman we did not yet get a reaction.

On Jerusalem, all of us – Samih el-Abed, Rami [Nasrallah, a peace activist], Akkhlam {Samih’s wife], Faris Sayigh [a Palestinian academic and brother of Yezid], Barakat, Elyanor [architect and town planner], Shmuel, Boaz, and myself – went to Holland. I asked Ron to stay at home to take care of [some] major issues:

1. The visit of Dutch Foreign Minister van Mierlo to Orient House. [Dutch Ambassador] Kroner complained bitterly to me when a newspaper article reported that Israeli police would block the Orient House, in order to prevent van Mierlo physically reaching it. He wanted to prevent such an embarrassment, but saw no way the visit of van Mierlo to Orient House could be called off, as van Mierlo had spoken to the Dutch Parliament about it and it had been dealt with at length by the Dutch press. I wanted Ron to stay to find a workable solution with Yossi and Faisal, which they did (so I hear). Yossi said that it was against government policy and what they were asking was to eat chazir (pig) and say it was kosher. We could not do that, but no violent opposition would be raised. This evening (8/1) Kroner will see Yossi on that matter.
2. A second issue for Ron to attend to was related to impediments imposed by the IDF – and particularly by the Southern Command – upon the Palestinian business community. A situation had developed where existing regulations were ridiculously prohibitive. For example, [Palestinian businessmen] Amin Haddad and Yussuf Ghanem, who had wanted to conclude a $50 million deal, were not allowed into Gaza, as vehicles were prohibited from entering, and had to finalise the deal standing in Erez outside the car. On the other hand, the IDF senior bureaucrats understood that changes had to be introduced, and the PM and Minister of Defence were quite willing to take very far-reaching and courageous decisions. In one way or another, [the IDF bureaucrats] had asked Yossi to come up with practical suggestions. So Ron had to work on them, and had two important meetings scheduled – one with the Advisor on Arab Affairs and one with several lieutenant colonels in Oren Shachor’s office (COGAT). Before they could come up with practical suggestions, there occurred the death of the ‘engineer’ Yahya Ayyash, the [Hamas] guy who had engineered the most destructive terror acts of the last year and who had on his conscience the death of about 100 (or more) Israelis.

Ron phoned me immediately, fearing, not without justification, that all efforts might now go down the drain and the cycle of violence would start again. During the following 48 hours we saw again and again the hysterical hate-ridden Palestinian mass-mob, calling for ‘revenge’ and committing themselves to tens and hundreds of new suicide terror acts against Israel. Worst of all was Arafat’s reaction, stemming undoubtedly from weakness, daring to ‘accuse’ Israel of an act of aggression. He evidently hoped to calm the mob down and plant his flag in the direction of the wind (or the rising storm?), evidently showing us what a difficult partner he is. I told our Palestinian friends, who were together with us in The Hague, that similar behaviour on Israel’s part would have been unthinkable. Imagine that Baruch Goldstein had not have been killed at the moment of his murderous act, but six or eight months later. Would then any one serious in Israel have seriously protested? I doubt it. Whatever, that is the reality that we – and, as a matter of fact, Arafat himself – have to face. The deeper problem is not merely in Israeli-Palestinian relations – although there the hate relationship is undoubtedly extremely intense – but similarly a part of the Palestinian people’s relationship and attitude towards its own authority. The lack of grassroots legitimacy of Arafat again and again creates outbursts of anger and violence, with which Arafat is forced to go along, rather than insist on imposing law and order. In this context, I am quite convinced that in the medium and long terms (obviously not immediately), a people-to-people process addressing grassroots organisations creates a more confident civil society that, because it will have its own rights and duties, will be more willing to accept the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority.

The discussions on Jerusalem were, I believe, very useful. This time it was the Palestinian show and they had done their homework. They presented us with a paper that defined commonly accepted positions. Altogether, there was relatively little to fight about, though more to add to it. I, probably unwisely, gave a general outline of the forthcoming negotiations and the meaning of Oslo A and B, which frightened them. Sameech el-Abed [a professor for regional planning who served as Deputy Minister of Planning and later as Minister of Housing and Public Works] was already quite terrified from the fact that his name was mentioned in a report in a Jordanian newspaper, and I frightened him even more.

Nevertheless, the decision was taken, at least as I understand it, to look towards a second stage of the Jerusalem group’s work – to define the strategic guidelines or directives for a Master Plan and then develop major projects. The Dutch, who are quite impressed by our performance, said the second phase could cost up to about $1 million. It is quite a compliment.

9 JANUARY 1996 – Paris, Charles de Gaulle

Yesterday evening, I met Maher el-Kurd [an economist, economic advisor to Arafat and peace negotiator] and he discussed with me the possibility of looking into Final Status matters. Abu Mazen had encouraged him to do so, and had also told him that it was important to establish an independent and parallel channel to that of Hassan Asfour-Abu Ala-Uri Savir-Shimon Peres.

Moreover, Abu Mazen had encouraged Maher to establish a team, which would also include Hisham Mustapha and Hayat al-Fahoum [who was head of the European department in Tunis, working under Farouk Kaddoumi, a Palestinian pro-Syrian leader who was opposed to the Oslo Agreements]. This team could start its work with us by first looking at ways and means on how to annul the Covenant. The idea Maher wanted to develop was that the Palestinian Council should promulgate a new constitution for Palestine, whereas the PNC should be asked to approve and ratify it. This idea has quite a lot of advantages for them and for us, and might be combined with an Israeli-Palestinian Memo of Understanding[10] (this is my comment, Maher made no such remark). If there is really full support from Abu Mazen, which there apparently is, it means that he is in practice creating two channels with us. He and we may control and coordinate them without others – at least without Hassan (Asfour) – knowing it.

Maher spoke quite a lot about Farouk Kaddoumi. He was confident that talks between Israel and Syria will succeed sooner or later, and Israeli-Palestinian relations will develop towards a crisis. Then the Syrians will promote Palestinian interests, and will view Kaddoumi as their main man. Moreover, Maher argued, Arafat was positioning himself into a situation whereby Abu Mazen would be seen by the Palestinian public as the leader of the ‘dovish’ camp, Kaddoumi as the leader of the ‘hawkish’ camp, and Arafat himself could maneuver between the two.

Maher el-Kurd then discussed economic matters with me at length. Arafat was now establishing a committee for Financing and Investment, and Maher would head it. Its basic task was to prepare for international support after the donor money was used up. At today’s meeting of the donor community in Paris, they had already signed protocols for assistance of $500 million, and Arafat wanted to obtain a commitment for another $1 billion. This should be relatively easy, Maher argued, as such a sum had in fact already been pledged in Washington in October 1993, and there was no reason why it should not be pledged again before the Palestinian elections. Thereafter, Maher would have to look for soft loans, and had to think of how to reorganise the entire system. He had a pledge from the EU of ECU 2,000,000, for a study on how to organise a Palestinian Development Bank and he would be interested to sit with [former Governor of the Bank of Israel] Arnon Gafni, to see how his experience could be brought in.

After Oslo, Arafat had established a monopoly system for cement, gas and oil, sugar etc. Maher had told Arafat that this had to stop, as it was an untenable system in the medium and long terms. Arafat defended his action, saying the monopolies had helped him survive the first year in Gaza, as he had received a monthly income of tens of millions of dollars. He had urgently needed to maintain some kind of control and balance, and to give some pay offs. Arafat and Maher were presently also worried about the fact that the Palestinian leadership had largely lost control over economic affairs – instead of a relatively free but centrally controlled system, an uncontrollable system of ‘economic warlordism’ or feudal fiefs had developed: Samir Huleileh [a Palestinian businessmen] and Abu Ala on the one hand; Nabil Shaath and Majdi Khaldi [nowadays, Director General of the President’s Office under President Abu Mazen] on the other; Jamal Tarifi [Palestinian businessmen and negotiator in charge of coordination with Israel] and Soha [Arafat’s wife] also. Somehow, this system had to be revisited and reorganised.

This was particularly true in matters of infrastructure, where most contracts had been signed with the help of a Lebanese, Pierre Reziq (?). Also, [attorney and former US congressman] Mel Levine’s partner had done much work – most contracts were signed by companies that were registered in the [unreadable] islands (between Florida and Cuba) – they were one of the many tax havens. Some of these concessions had to be fully legalised; others had to be superseded by other contracts.

In the past, they had made the mistake of offering too few of the big contracts to the United States. Ed Abbington [American diplomat who served as US Consul General in Jerusalem to the PA] had cautiously complained about it, and Maher and Ed had agreed that after his return, Maher would sit together with Ed Abbington’s economic team in order to check where US interests could be taken care of; any input from us would be most welcome.

Maher was now negotiating with the Norwegians on the establishment of a power station in the sea, with a capacity of 160 Megawatt. The Palestinians needed only 100 Megawatt, yet Minister [of Energy and Infrastructure, Gonen] Segev had said Israel would guarantee the purchase of an additional 60 Megawatts; hereby the deal could be made. Godal (the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs) had introduced the Norwegian business people to Maher and they were now here in Paris, trying to discuss and finalise matters. Maher was presently also planning to sign a major contract on a housing project with a Dutch firm and one or more Israeli firms, who could be subcontractors to the Dutch.

Altogether, neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians had implemented Annexes III and IV of the Oslo Agreement. Maher had spoken to Arafat about it and had obtained a green light to go ahead with us in looking into the various suggestions made there and trying to implement them. For instance, Arafat would like to check the possibility of the Med-Dead Canal. (I promised to get Maher in touch with Ilan Ma’oz.) Other issues of Annexes III and IV should be taken up and implemented.

Maher was negotiating with the EIB (European Investment Bank) who were most willing to provide funds for infrastructure projects. He, on his part, wanted to work out a programme defining the necessary criteria and priorities for a comprehensive understanding with the European Investment Bank; also here he would appreciate to get an input from us, in order not to permit an over-flooding of uncontrolled projects that might be submitted to the EIB. Maher ‘killed’ the flower programme, which may not necessarily increase the ‘love’ between him and Nabil Shaath.

Maher was most interested in the connection with Wallenberg. My idea – that Wallenberg should make three people available full-time, for 6-8 months, to study what could be done in the fields of infrastructure, energy, industry and tourism – very much appealed to him, and he would gladly and fully cooperate.

Finally, Maher told me about his connection with Ahmad Zaki al-Yamani’s [the son of the former Saudi oil minister]. He had invested in Cuba, Namibia, and (Red)-China, obviously with support from the Saudi King, into areas that were seen to be on the geographic and political fringes. He was now interested in investing in the Palestinian areas and in Israel (and perhaps also in Lebanon and Syria?). His first idea was to establish a chain of three-star hotels (this might be the beginning of a regional cooperation in tourism (?)) and he had some other ideas for investment in mind.

Maybe I read too much into Maher’s messages, but basically it appears that he is sending two signals: First, him acting on behalf of Arafat and Abu Mazen will go quite some way to strengthen Yossi, if Yossi will only ‘play ball’; second, in order to move ahead in final status issues before elections, they will be willing to create a lot of ‘goodies’ to help Shimon market the idea publically, whatever he should agree to.

Maher did not say this; he is also not aware of the Stockholm understandings; but in my view, his message adds up to that. It might make sense to set up a working group to provide Maher with some substantial input.

24 JANUARY 1996

We had a 10-minute meeting with Shimon. It was extremely well prepared by Zikki [Dr Zvia Walden, Peres’ daughter] on his side, and by us on ours. We had preparatory sessions with Nimrod and Yossi. Yossi told us that he could not sleep the night before, and as a matter of fact I too felt rather nervous. Shimon started off with a friendly but tough tone. Then he was asking us for our assistance. We should look into the issues involved in cancelling the Charter. We were delighted to get a direct request from him. He then said we should check with Faisal (el-Husseini) on how to decrease political tension around Orient House: the visit of Foreign Ministers had to end. Either Faisal would agree to stop it, and we would find a modus operandi – Vice Ministers of Foreign Affairs could go – or Faisal would not oblige, and Peres would eventually close Orient House and also get a reward out of such a move – but he would prefer to find an agreed upon solution.

Moreover, we should tell Arafat to take care of terrorists he currently tolerated in Gaza. He (Arafat) complained about [Israel killing] Ayyash, but could have taken care of him and put him in prison – but he instead permitted him to go freely in the Gaza Strip. Now, he was permitting others to do the same. We should also deal with this. Lastly, we should look into matters related to the Arab citizens of Israel and find ways to make them vote and possibly even vote Labor.

We then asked how to stay in touch, and the answer was directly with him – not via Yossi, nor via Zikki, nor via anyone else.

29 JANUARY 1996 – (Meeting Hussein and Ahmed before their meeting with Arafat)

Yossi talked about the discussions for early Israeli elections. Haim Ramon was pressing for it – the Likud was now down and Bibi does not have the trust even of his own people. Yossi then gave an overview of Shimon’s position, saying it was very difficult for him that Rabin had gone and he had to take the decisions by himself. He did not like our ideas, and saw in them several pitfalls. His support for a functional solution was not a dogma, but resulted from his understanding that there was no possibility to solve all questions in a permanent settlement.  For him the decisive issue now was the change of the Covenant and he will not move before that. If Arafat will move to change it, it will have a major impact.

The Likud leadership already said they will speak to the PLO if the Covenant is changed. [Likud MK] Dan Meridor went beyond that – he did not believe the PLO would change the Covenant; but if it does, he said it ‘will be a new ball game’. Now, Yossi said, most of the Labor leadership is concerned with negotiations – therefore, many will support our concept (he was referring particularly to Haim Ramon). When Yossi spoke about a solution of the settlers’ problem, there was among the Palestinians a sigh of relief. Everybody wants to know where the border will be.[11]

After all this, we prepared for their meeting with Arafat. I went to sleep at about 10.30 pm, asking them to wake me up after they returned from seeing Arafat. At about midnight, they were back, giving us a detailed and rather depressing report. Arafat was exuberant due to the election victory (of 20 January) and also due to the fact that one day earlier (28 January) he had seen King Hussein, who had told him he hoped for a Palestinian State under Arafat’s control, as soon as possible, obviously with the capital as Jerusalem. To us, Arafat made the following points:

1. There will be no change of the Charter without an agreement on a state with the capital al-Quds;
2. The PNC will not meet unless there is an agreement before that;
3. When the PNC will meet (after agreement with us) he will cancel the Charter and promulgate a Constitution for the State;
4. Israel should not be surprised if the elected Council announces a State. Europe will recognise it; only the US and Israel would not, and they eventually would also do so; so what did it matter if they gave their acceptance later?;
5. Just as Peres said that Jerusalem is not negotiable; so for the Palestinian side, the State is not negotiable;
6. The Jordanians have no influence anymore, neither in the West Bank, nor in Gaza; they tried to get at least one of their candidates elected, and did not succeed.

Arafat, they said, was ‘full of himself’ and is making demands, rather than being willing to consider any conciliatory move on his side. He spoke to Peres and demanded withdrawal from Hebron. About the tactics of negotiations he said also ‘we have no need to give in – during Oslo B, we were offered at first 5 per cent of the West Bank, and we got 31 per cent by insisting.’

Arafat feels now is the time for a state. He feels he has international support, Arab support, and African support – even King Hussein was fully with him. Arafat ridiculed Israeli expectations that he would be compliant. He will not say this publicly, because he understands that he is contractually obliged to annul the Covenant and he will not give Israel any public justification to take measures against him, or accuse him of not keeping his word.

Arafat also said that as soon as he had the opportunity, he would encourage the Council to announce a Palestinian State with its capital Jerusalem. He also indicated that the Stockholm Document compromise formulas were not acceptable to him – and he would now ask for more.

I could not sleep. Altogether the message was devastating.

15 FEBRUARY 1996

On the issue of the Covenant, it appears that many cooks are cooking and Arafat is telling everybody something else. The last two weeks we were occupied with people-to-people activities. We had now worked over a year on different people-to-people groups and were planning to present our suggested activities at the United Nations in New York to [former Egyptian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and then UN Secretary General] Boutros-Boutros Ghali. The Norwegians were financing this activity. On 6 February, Ron and I had a surprise meeting in Jerusalem. We had fixed a date with Ed Abbington and expected to have a quiet political conversation on Jerusalem and final status issues and the like. When we came, six people were waiting for us: Ed Abbington, Jim Larocco [the US DCM at Tel Aviv], three of their assistants, and Muna Yuul. Ed Abbington opened the meeting saying that [Secretary of State under Clinton] Warren Christopher had spoken to Peres and addressed the question of ‘people-to-people’. The only game in town was what we were doing, therefore we should tell them how to proceed.

I gave them a rather detailed account of our thinking. Different (Israeli-Palestinian) hubs were necessary on different issues: women, youth, schools, students, artists, environment, research, health, etc. etc. Each and every NGO should be able to join and take part, and supporting donor coalitions should be built around every hub: the Austrians for Artists; the Dutch for Environment; the Swedes and Danes for Health; the US (Hillary Clinton) for Women; the EU for Youth. The existing projects, other projects and the preparation of a five-year programme, should be developed in each group and financed.

A week later, on 13 February, we had another meeting with Jim Larocco. Jim told us that following our meeting at the US Consulate General in Jerusalem, they had a conference with the Washington actors and, by and large, adopted the structure I had proposed. In the centre of the people-to-people activities would be FAFO, who would coordinate their activities with Ilan Baruch [from the MFA] and Janet Aviad [from the Bronfman Foundation], together with [Palestinian politician] Hassan Abu Libdeh and another Palestinian. PCH [Palestine Council of Health] and ECF should remain the main ‘drivers’ of the process.

I was also told that on the industrial parks, the US Embassy had adopted our proposals of last year – to go ahead first with Karni [at the north-eastern end of the Gaza Strip].

The weekend before, Hikmat Ajoury [from the PCH] had an unpleasant surprise for me. On Shabbat (10 February), he phoned me at home to tell me that the Palestinians could not go to the United Nations in New York. The PLO’s UN ambassador, Nasr el-Kidwa, had made a major affair of it, and Arafat himself had taken a decision: no visit to the UN, yet full ok to continue ‘people-to-people’. (I was later told that Nasr el-Kidwa opposed the idea, as it would throw ‘too much good light on the Israelis’.)

19 FEBRUARY 1996

Tamara Barnea got me to speak to Arnon Mansberg and Jacque Haviv in order to get the Joint and Brookdale Israel fully on board.[12] She gave me the headlines, of what I should say. It went extremely well, and I got two big kisses from Tamara at the end of the meeting.

22 FEBRUARY 1996

In the morning, we had a meeting of the Environment Group with Dan Rosenberg from the Dutch Embassy in Tel Aviv, and Willam Belaerts from the Dutch delegation in Jericho. Jad Isaac [Palestinian environmentalist and regional planner] and Muhammad Said were there and the Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel. They decided to get 32 Palestinian NGOs on board. To define a complementary approach of NGOs and Government agencies in order to get the entire act together, it would make sense to create a joint Israeli-Palestinian Committee of Environment NGOs. The Dutch were seriously impressed.

February 25 1996

At 6.45 am, a bus exploded in Jerusalem. At about 10.30 am, we knew that Tamara’s son Yoni was among the victims. She phoned me in the office almost immediately, wanting to tell me she would continue to work on People to People issues and she wanted me to inform Hikmat. When, on the same evening, Dan Meridor came to pay his condolences, she spoke to him for over 30 minutes about people-to-people and apparently got him on board.

The funeral of Yonatan [Yoni] Barnea was terribly sad. It was raining heavily, as if the sky and God were crying. In his eulogy, [father and journalist] Nahum Barnea said: ‘Yonatan did not know any hate, not even at the moment of his murder.’ While standing at the funeral, ambulances and police cars were driving with much noise to north Jerusalem, where another terror act was committed by a Palestinian driver, who drove into kids waiting on the trempiada [hitchhiking spot] to the North.

By coincidence, Israel Harel and I were standing beside each other, inducing Tamara to remark that if Israel Harel and I would meet at Yonatan’s funeral, it was a sign that matters were turning for the better.

As a matter of fact, the same evening Harel and I met at the Hyatt. The evening before, he had been on TV and had said that the government was negotiating with the Palestinians out of a position of weakness, and therefore negotiations were doomed to fail.

I took up this theme, arguing that the government was negotiating on the basis of a realistic appraisal of the Israeli-Palestinian-Arab power relationship. Israel [Harel] himself had told me in one of our earlier discussions that he knew the Palestinians were there to stay (on the West Bank). He did not know whether this would be the case for the settlements, and therefore he wanted people-to-people between the settlements and the neighbouring Palestinian villages and towns, in order to create a day-to-day modus vivendi.

Accordingly, I asked him if it wouldn’t make sense for the settlers to accept the Beilin-Abu Mazen document, come on board, participate in the negotiations, try to improve the Israeli position here and there, and reach an understanding that would serve the best interests of the settlers, of Israel, as well as of the Palestinians.

Israel gave me a very honest answer. For them, the provisions of the Stockholm document (Beilin-Abu Mazen) was similar to a proposal to amputate a leg or a hand of their body: maybe this had to be done, and in the end they would accept, but they (the settlers) could not be expected to agree to such an amputation without putting up at first a fight to prevent it.

March 3 1996

Almost at the same time and the same place (Bus No. 18), there was another terror attack on the bus, and then afterwards the attack on the Dizengoff Center, not too far away from the place of the terror attack of Bus No. 5. It appeared to be an all-out war. Shimon looked devastated, saying all the right words; his body language was a language of despair and helplessness.

March 10 1996

We have just under three months until the elections. At the airport in Tel Aviv, I met Marc Zell, a lawyer who had served the settlers I had met back around 1990. Waiting to embark, we had time to discuss. He claimed he was a close associate and advisor to Bibi Netanyahu. Marc is pleasant, clever and dogmatic. He said Bibi, if elected, would keep all the international affairs in the PM’s office – David Levy as Minister of Foreign Affairs would only be a figure head and [Member of Knesset; served as Israeli Ambassador to Washington under Netanyahu] Zalman Shoval would be very important. Their policy would be to maintain the Oslo Agreements and permit the Palestinian enclaves to develop; to offer them a non-interventionist approach supporting the development of free enterprise, they would start final status negotiations aiming at consolidating the status quo. The main change would be in regard to the Palestinian security forces and police. It was unbearable that the Palestinians would maintain such forces – they had to be curtailed and Israel would unilaterally assert control over all security measures.

The very concept of Oslo – that the forces of pragmatism on both sides had to cooperate against the forces of militancy and radicalism – was, in substance, alien to them. The old zero-sum game thinking was still all dominant. I hope we shall never have to find out if I am right about them.

Postscript (JANUARY 2025)

What we found out: My conclusions then and now

1. I was shaken by the depth of Palestinian hate, as well as by the hate of the Israeli radical militant national-religious rank and file against Rabin, Peres, and us.
2. I was fully aware of the difficulties of reaching a final status agreement. Instead, I was convinced that it was necessary to at first reach understandings and agreements with Israel’s pragmatic right, and a working partnership with our Palestinian partners.
3. An understanding with Israel’s right was essential in order to take strong and effective measures against the radical militant messianic rabbis.
4. I did convince Yossi Beilin to reach an understanding with powerful representatives of Israel’s right, which on 22 January 1997 led to the conclusion of the ‘Joint National Platform’ with Likud, Gesher and Zomet politicians. (Although I myself did not participate).
5. The understandings reached in the ‘Joint National Platform’ offered sufficient common ground for negotiations with the Palestinians – by creating a sense of partnership, without solving all problems in one step, which I understood would not be achievable.
6. The partnership we had developed allowed us to prepare solutions regarding practical, day-to-day issues regarding security, Jerusalem, refugees and people-to-people cooperation that would pave the way for gradual progress towards a Permanent Status Agreement.
7. I was very critical of the Persian Bazar negotiating approach adopted to reach the Oslo B Agreement – offering too little at the beginning, but offering more after Palestinian rejections, only reinforced Palestinian rejectionist tendencies.
8. I understood the need to understand Arafat’s strategic behaviour, to find ways and means to block his inclination to tolerate or even encourage terrorist acts against Israel. Instead it was necessary and possible to conclude; understandings of a win-win-win nature, fully in line with Israel’s national interests. . By doing so, ECF prepared the following understandings:
   1. A code of conduct committing to non-violence. Arafat committed to it in Stockholm in December 1998; Neither Netanyahu nor Barak followed up.
   2. An Economic Permanent Status Agreement, signed by Maher el-Kurd and David Brodet;
   3. A Trilateral Israel-Palestine-Jordan Security Agreement (the Israeli team was headed by Gilad Sher);
   4. People-to-people activities.

9. I had always been aware of the regional component of the conflict. In a 1992 study, I argued that after the initial stage of concluding Palestinian self-government, we should work on creating a Middle Eastern Security Organisation and a Middle Eastern Community for Water, Energy and Trade before entering Israeli-Palestinian final status negotiations. Instead of this, the earlier United States support for radical militant Islamic groups in Afghanistan, followed by the occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq and then the withdrawal, allowed the rise of militant Islamist state and non-state actors to pursue a genocidal strategy against the state of Israel and the Jewish people at large. The essential content of Beilin-Abu Mazen was again offered by Olmert in 2008 and slightly changed in 2014 by Netanyahu in the framework agreement. The paradigm has been repeatedly brought to failure by terror acts. The western narrative that the occupation has caused the acts of terror has, in my view, reversed the cause and its effect.
10. Today, neither Israel, nor the Palestinians are capable of reaching a peacebuilding agreement between them. . The remaining common interest is to achieve the envisaged Middle East Security Organisation (Alliance); and a Middle Eastern Community for Water, Energy and Trade. The shared commitment to turn the India-Middle East-Europe-Economic Corridor (IMEC) into the decisive peace-building driver does provide hope, against all odds, for a better future.

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[1]     Editorial Note: Din Rodef Literally ‘law of the pursuer’ – originally intended in a scenario in which Person A ‘pursues’ Person B to kill him, Person A can be killed. Before Rabin’s death, some Rabbis used the term to refer to him, arguing that the Oslo Accords were putting Jewish lives in danger.

[2]     Fathom Editorial Note: In December 1992, Israel deported over 400 Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza to southern Lebanon, some for one year and others for two years. The deportation decision was reached after an Israeli policeman (Nissim Toledano) was killed by Palestinians.

[4]       Hirschfeld editorial note: Significant industrialists, the Popper family owed OSEM and their main aim was to sell their goods in the West Bank and Gaza and compete – with the local Palestinian competitors. Gillerman represented these interests as the Chairman of the Chambers of Commerce. The simple power equation limited the capacity of Palestinian enterprises to compete.

[5]     Hirschfeld editorial note: A former Mossad agent, Yossi Alpher, organised the meetings between the Palestinian and the settler leadership. He later published the proceedings and its content in And the Wolf Shall Dwell with the Wolf: the Settlers and the Palestinians (Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 2001, Hebrew).

[6]      Hirschfeld editorial note: Based on discussions I had had with Abe Suleyman, I was convinced that negotiations with Syria [especially before Israeli elections], was setting Peres up for failure [with Syria].

[7]      Hirschfeld editorial note: Because Assad was determined to get a ‘better deal than Egypt achieved with Israel’ (when Israel withdrew from the entire Sinai desert) peace with Syria would have potentially undermined not just Egyptian interests but also Saudi interests. Therefore, peace with Syria would require rethinking the entire architecture of the Middle East.

[8]       Hirschfeld editorial comment: The security concept provided for a time-limited Israeli presence in the Jordan valley; but more additional arrangements, with Jordan and Israeli warning stations on the Alon-line and the mountain ridge of the west bank. The basic security concept was trilateral, we perceived the Jordanian eastern and northern border as Israel’s security border, and security understandings related hereto. Under the professional guidance of Gilad Sher, in 1999, we produced a detailed trilateral security paper, which King Hussein and PM Barak accepted, and Arafat ignored/rejected. I did not think that Peres was really strategically opposed; rather his motive was political. The main reason was his fear that he would not be able to obtain the necessary majority. The same holds true for Jerusalem; On Jerusalem we had assured a long-term two-third control of the entire enlarged Jerusalem area. Ezer Weizman’s remark that “it was a dream” was based on this.

[9]       Hirschfeld editorial comment: Israel Harel wanted our help to regulate relations between settlements and their Palestinian neighbors, and prevent friction. Ron Shatzberg was in ECF in charge of it and delivered several such understandings together with a Palestinian counterpart, who served in the Palestinian security.

[10]     Hirschfeld editorial comment. Later, during 1998, I suggested that an Israeli-Palestinian Memo of Understanding should be in essence a ‘code of conduct” and we – Hussein, Ahmed, Ron and myself, prepared a speech for Arafat that he held in Stockholm in December 1998, speaking of the need “to move from the logic of war, to the logic of peace.” Neither Netanyahu, nor Barak followed up.

[11]     Hirschfeld editorial note: Delineating the border would allow for the establishment of a Palestinian state; while 87 % of the settlers would remain in their homes and settlements, would be annexed to Israel, and their future would become secure. (That was our hope – in reality both sides viewed the negative components of the proposals: the Palestinians were not capable of giving up one inch of territory; as were the settlers, not willing to recognise Palestinian sovereignty.)

[12]     Hirschfeld editorial note: The idea of HUBS was meant to include the major actors in each field in the P2P activities. The US “Joint” and particularly the “Brookdale Institute” were probably the most important actor on health and social affairs issues, and it made sense to coordinate our cooperation with Palestine Council of Health with them. Tamara Barnea played a leading role in this endeavor.