‘Amidst a lot of a sloganeering, Fathom provides nuanced discussion. It fills a real gap.’ **Amnon Rubinstein.** Israeli law scholar, politician, and columnist. A member of the Knesset between 1977 and 2002, he served in several ministerial positions.

‘Fathom is an insightful, measured and thought provoking publication.’ **Professor Clive Jones.** Chair in Regional Security School of Government and International Affairs, University of Durham

‘Many people have deeply held beliefs and passionate opinions about Israel and the Middle East. Very few people actually know about Israel and the Middle East. Fathom is an excellent source for those who wish to join the camp of those who actually know something about Israel, rather than just have an opinion about it.’ **Einat Wilf,** Baye Foundation Adjunct Fellow, The Washington Institute; Senior Fellow, The Jewish People Policy Institute.

‘The importance of the Israel/Palestine conflict for world peace is sometimes exaggerated, but for those of us focused on the conflict, for those of us who hope for peace here, even amidst the surrounding chaos, “two states for two peoples” remains the necessary guiding idea. Fathom magazine is one of the key places where that idea is explained and defended; it deserves our strongest support.’ **Michael Walzer,** Professor Emeritus at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton University.

‘It is so refreshing to read Fathom; a publication that elucidates the complexities of politics in Israel and the Middle East.’ **Dr Jonathan Rynhold.** Director, Argov Center for the Study of Israel and the Jewish People, Deputy Head, Dept. of Political Studies, Bar-Ilan University.

‘Some of the most creative thinking is going on over at Fathom journal these days. I can read Israelis and Palestinians, Brits and Americans who refuse to give up on the “two states for two peoples” paradigm. I really value that.’ **Ian Austin** UK MP.

‘Fathom is a must read for all those interested in Israel, its politics, economics, culture and its place in the wider Middle-East and the world.’ **Alex Brummer,** prize winning journalist and author.

‘At a time when dangerous clichés threaten to overwhelm political and moral intelligence we need Fathom’s vibrant, smart contribution more than ever.’ **Mitchell Cohen,** Editor Emeritus Dissent and Professor of Political Science, Bernard Baruch College and the Graduate School of the City University of New York.

‘In an atmosphere where many supporters of the Palestinian right to self-determination would deny Israel’s right to exist, and no few supporters of Zionism would deny the Palestinian right to self-determination, voices like Fathom’s are indispensable. Unflinching in its honesty, rigorous in its criticisms, Fathom has been a clear and persistent voice to uphold the two state solution as both morally consistent on universal democratic grounds, and politically pragmatic. Fathom is one of the best sources.’ **Gadi Taub,** Israeli historian, screenwriter, political commentator and Senior Lecturer at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
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PREFACE

TIM MARSHALL


With the kaleidoscope still being shaken, in this age of uncertainty, Fathom’s role is more important than ever. We are still assessing the emerging realignments in the Middle East, the intentions of the Trump presidency, the diplomatic impacts of the future Brexit, and the shapeshifting of the newly disguised but ancient antisemitic strains of thought. These issues require sharp thinking and clear explanations and this is where Fathom excels.

What we find in the pages, and now audio visual work of Fathom, is clarity of explanation, freedom from jargon, but no compromise of intellectual endeavour. It probes the familiar issues but often brings fresh thinking to them. This review showcases these attributes with writings on politics, international relations, economics, history, identity, and literature.

Add to the above an ability to spot trends and a commitment to reach out to a spectrum of views, and you understand why the journal has grown, and why it reaches an influential readership.

In the digital age political discourse has been coarsened, splintered, and simultaneously, (though this might sound contradictory) become more binary than ever. That may be a negative development but it has also made it all the more important to create and sustain fora for calm, rationale, and balanced debate. It has caused a real thirst for such a place from an educated thinking audience which is irritated by media shouting matches and the hysterical biases of social media. Fathom exists in this space and helps to strengthen and widen it.
MESSAGE FROM THE EDITORS

WELCOME TO THE 2016 FATHOM REVIEW.

Fathom is BICOM’s quarterly journal of expert analysis, informed opinion and genuine debate.

Our job is to create a deeper understanding of Israel and the region among the world’s opinion-formers by combining the authority of the scholarly journal with state-of-the-art communication technologies and the limitless reach of social media. Our network of expert contributors and opinion-forming readers spans the globe. So our political bandwidth is necessarily broad: you won’t agree with everything you read in every issue.

In 2016 Fathom grew in every way.

- The quarterly Fathom Journal now has more than a quarter of a million readers, a 66 per cent increase in one year. And we published 77 writers in 2016 compared to 48 in 2015, a 60 per cent increase.

- Our weekly Fathom Highlight email reaches over 8000 of today’s (and tomorrow’s) opinion-formers and is read in the world’s foreign ministries, editorial offices, think tanks, universities and party HQs.

- We began to live stream our monthly Fathom Forums (see p.50).

- And for the first time we organised what will become the bi-annual Fathom Israeli academic speaker tour (see p.52).

We created Fathom because Israel faces a new strategic threat: delegitimisation. In other words, being made a pariah state by hostile intellectuals and activists who are entrenched in the media, academia, the trades unions, the churches and civil society. From these bases they have been waging a battle of ideas against the Jewish state for decades, often unchallenged.

We created Fathom because we cannot defeat this strategic threat to the Jewish state without a sophisticated and long-term intellectual response: the creation of a hub that pulses out influence in the form of an intellectually coherent and academically respectable defence of the Jewish homeland, cast in terms of broadly liberal and democratic values.

Fathom can convince opinion-formers and decision-makers because it has the historical depth, the explanatory power and the values-base to move them; no, not to support every single policy shift in Jerusalem, but to support Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish homeland with full rights for its national minority, in peace and security.

In 2016 no one covered the question of when anti-Zionism becomes antisemitism more comprehensively than Fathom. We developed the intellectual case that anti-Semitic anti-Zionism
exists, we traced its history, especially on parts of the left, and we analysed its role in the UK Labour Party’s crisis in 2016. Our coverage was praised in op-eds in the New York Times and the Fathom editor was invited to discuss the phenomenon on BBC Newsnight.

We hope this small selection of extracts from 2016 Fathom Review will draw you to the website if you don’t already know it. You will find there: over 250 expert articles, interviews, book reviews, and videos. You will find accessible writing at a beautiful website, fathomjournal.org.

We have big plans for expansion in 2017: as well as four more quarterly issues of the journal, 12 monthly Forums and a weekly Highlight email, there will be a Fathom conference on the legacy of the 1967 Six-Day War, more Fathom Israeli Academic Speaker tours, eBooks on the 1967 War and anti-Semitic anti-Zionism, and more.

Our ambition is huge: to help realign intellectual opinion about the right and the rightness of the existence of a homeland for the Jewish people, Israel. Because of your support we have achieved more in four years than anyone thought possible. And we have just got going.

We value your continued support.
CONTRIBUTORS TO FATHOM IN 2016

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We are weak because there is no Palestinian non-violent movement

Ali Abu Awwad is a leading Palestinian activist and the founder of several peace movements

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For peace, we need vision, hope and bridge-building (Interview)

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GRISHA YAKUBOVICH
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Grisha Yakubovich was recently Head of the Civil Coordination Department of the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT)
There is an intense debate in Israel about whether we can be all these things at once: the nation-state of the Jewish people, a democracy, and a country with a commitment to the human rights of all living in it, Arabs as well as Jews.

A positive answer was given by the international community in the partition resolution of 29 November 1947, and in Israel’s Declaration of Independence of May 1948. However, the conditions that facilitated the UN resolution and the Declaration have been seriously eroded, both within Israel and outside it.

Today there is a growing political polarisation within Israel and this is dangerous. Too many voices are cherry-picking between being Jewish, democratic, and showing respect for human rights. Rather than working through the tensions within the founding vision by democratic participation and deliberation, too many seem happy to delegitimise those who make a different choice of cherry.

Liberal and non-religious Jews resist the orthodox monopoly over matters of Jewish identity and personal status, and claim that it is inconsistent with democracy and human rights. They demand separation of state and religion.

Most Arabs and many left-liberal Jews claim that the continued occupation of the West Bank, and the fact that Palestinians there and Gaza do not enjoy civil and political rights within Israel, is inconsistent with human rights and democracy.

Some add that it endangers the viability and justification of the Jewish state itself. They demand ending the occupation, ending Jewish settlement in the occupied territories, and recognising Palestinians’ right to self-determination.

Most Arabs and some liberal Jews say Israel within the 1967 lines cannot be Jewish, democratic
and committed to human rights. Their recommendation is that Israel gives up its Jewishness, either ethnic-cultural or religious.

Some want Jewishness to trump all other values. They float plans to annex parts of the West Bank or to ‘trade’ the country’s Arab’s, against their will, for the settlement blocs. Or they suggest legislation that erodes both the human rights of Arabs within Israel and the secular cast of Israel’s jurisprudence and polity.

These tensions cannot be evaded, or resolved by elevating one value above others. Rather, they must be worked through politically, using the institutions and practices of democracy.

Democracy means the right of the particular demos of the state to decide the basic arrangements of the state, within the constraints of universal human rights. States may opt for a neutral, secular state, but they do not have to. Many states have ethnic and religious characteristics in their constitutions, while being fully committed to democracy, minority rights and civic equality. Moreover, in most societies, political morality is not nourished only by one’s civic allegiance. Patriotism and civic virtue are often based on religious and social communities.

And the fact is that only a very small minority of Jews and Arabs in Israel want to live in a neutral secular state. Arabs prefer a ‘state of all its peoples’ to the ‘state of all its citizens’ offered by some. In the absence of a feasible bi-national state, the better solution is that of ‘two states for two peoples,’ each a democracy protecting the human rights of all within it.

It follows that the problem in Israel today is not that an inconsistency between the three components of its vision – self-determination for Jews, democracy, and human rights – has suddenly been discovered. Rather, it is the reluctance to accept the validity of that vision, and to use democracy to craft a resolution of the tensions between the three components. This cannot be evaded: democracy and human rights are the framework within which the controversies should be discussed, but they cannot, in themselves, dictate the answers to these tensions.

To act wisely within Israel today, it is more urgent to think about the idea of democracy than the exact meaning of the Jewishness of the state. Israel is Jewish in the sense that the Jewish majority within it debates and decides how it wants to conduct the life of its national home, within the constraints of human rights. Democracy can decide the details.

It is better to struggle this way, through democratic political participation and deliberation. It is dangerous to declare that a freely elected government which does not implement your desired goals is, for that reason, simply not legitimate. Such statements are themselves a deep challenge to democracy. It is better not to make them in the name of democracy itself.

Read the full article at http://fathomjournal.org/
Michael Herzog has been a participant in nearly all Israeli-Palestinian negotiations since 1993. In this important essay, which we hope will be widely read, he argues that while set-piece bilateral talks seeking a final status agreement may be counterproductive in the current climate, there is much that Israel can do now, even without a Palestinian partner, in order to maintain the possibility of a two-state solution at a later date. (Extract)

I don’t see the value in forcing the parties to go back to the negotiating table at this moment. First, there is the challenge of Palestinian pre-conditions. In 2000 (Camp David) and 2008 (Olmert-Abu Mazen), we negotiated without any preconditions. In 2013-14 (the Kerry-led process) Israel was asked to choose one of three conditions – adopting the 1967 lines plus land swaps as the territorial baseline for negotiations, freezing settlement activities, or releasing those Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli prisons since before the Oslo Accords – in order to start the talks. Israel ultimately agreed to release prisoners (although due to incompatible bilateral US understandings with each of the parties not all of the prisoners were ultimately released). Today however the Palestinians demand all three of these elements in addition to an Israeli commitment to negotiate borders first and draw a map within three months. It is hard to see any Israeli government accepting this.

In any case, the two sides remain far apart regarding their red lines on core issues such as Jerusalem and refugees, so even if they were to return to negotiations the talks would likely fail. Moreover, failure is not cost-free, and a fourth collapse of negotiations (following Camp David in 2000, Annapolis in 2007-08 and the Kerry talks in 2013-14), will drive even more people towards despair regarding the future of the two-state solution.

It is thus time to consider different paradigms. Israel should shape its own future and destiny, not just respond to other parties’ initiatives or external attempted dictates. Because the logic of separating the two communities is in Israel’s interest, the country should signal that direction and start moving towards shaping a two-state reality, preferably with Palestinian partners but also with regional and international actors. Even without a Palestinian partner at this stage, Israel should implement a policy of constructive unilateralism that improves its security situation, maintains the possibility of a two state solution and keeps an extended hand open to the Palestinians to renew negotiations at a later date … this policy should include the following components:
Security – Israel should complete the security barrier between the West Bank and Israel in order to reduce friction between the two sides.

Cessation of settlement activity beyond the security barrier – This is in Israel’s long term interest and in line with its stated policy of favouring a two-state solution. Israel should not authorise construction in areas where we assume a future Palestinian state will be established.

Additional Israeli measures towards political separation – in Jerusalem … the current situation in which there is no overlap between the municipal boundaries of the city and the route of the security barrier has bred instability and chaos and should be altered. I would seek to amend the municipal boundaries and adjust the barrier accordingly.

Strengthening the PA’s economic and security capacity – Israel, regional actors and the international community should offer and facilitate (with proper auditing) a significant economic package to boost the PA. Israel should further improve access and movement for Palestinians in the West Bank and upgrade all existing fixed passages. It should also seek to expand its current policy of limiting incursions into area A to security threats the PA cannot or will not deal with.

Area C – In the context of enhancing the PA’s capacity, Israel can and should transfer powers and responsibilities to the PA in Area C (which constitutes about 60 per cent of the West Bank), such as planning, zoning and building adjacent to Area A – even without changing the territory’s legal designation, a task which falls within the purview of the bilateral political negotiations.

Palestinian governance – Hand in hand with enhancing the PA’s economic capacity, the international community should pay much greater attention to Palestinian governance. Particular focus should be paid to encouraging a smooth transition to a post-Abu Mazen era, with an eye to preventing it from being chaotic and endangering the stability of the PA.

Establishing a long-term ceasefire in Gaza – Based on the deterrence achieved in the last round of armed conflict in Gaza (2014) Israel should try to achieve a long-term ceasefire arrangement with Hamas in Gaza, involving the PA with an active role in Gaza.

Greater investment in the regional dimension – As noted above, conditions are now ripe for working together with major Arab countries in order to generate progress between Israelis and Palestinians. Egypt is ready to sponsor such a move. To facilitate such a regional process, Israel has to relate positively to the Arab Peace Initiative, which it has begun to do.

Political horizon – While pushing the parties to negotiate currently serves little purpose, creating a political horizon is crucial and should not be neglected. Based on our experience, the initial focus should be on defined parameters for negotiating and resolving the core issues that separate the parties.

Read the full article at http://fathomjournal.org/
HOW TO PRESERVE THE TWO STATE PARADIGM

KOBY HUBERMAN / MICHAEL MELCHIOR / YAIR HIRSCHFELD / HUSAM ZOMLOT

While the Israeli-Palestinian issue has been side-lined by many research institutes. Fathom has published a stream of writing to capture creative proposals – whether unilateral, regional, interim, bottom-up – for how to change the status quo in the Israeli-Palestinian arena and to move towards a two-state reality. The following interviews were part of a sustained programme that involved publishing two dozen articles, 5 forums, panel discussions involving negotiators and academics, a specially commissioned academic research into what works and why when it comes to peacebuilding in Israel and the West Bank and, most ambitiously partnering with Chatham House to organise of a set of ‘Track Two’ discussions between Israelis and Palestinians, out of which emerged the Grove Report, a policy paper exploring the possibility of a new ‘Hybrid’ approach to the peace process.

Koby Huberman is head of the Israel Peace Initiative (IPI). Michael Melchior was a member of Knesset for the Meimad Party, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and holds the title of Chief Rabbi of Norway. Yair Hirschfeld was a key architect of the Oslo Accords and is now the Director General of the Economic Cooperation Foundation (ECF) in Tel Aviv. Husam Zomlot serves as ambassador-at-large for the state of Palestine and adjunct professor of Government at Birzeit University. (Extracts)

How can Arab States help Israelis and Palestinians reach a solution and how can they help the Palestinians towards a deal?

Koby Huberman: There are five major areas in which Arab states could help the process. Number one, they could help the Palestinian leaders agree on concessions that otherwise wouldn’t be possible. When the Palestinian leaders have the backing of the entire Arab world – or the majority of the leading Arab states – their ability to make certain concessions changes. As one Palestinian ex-Minister told me ‘Look, we know that what you’re proposing is the right solution for the Palestinian refugee issue, but we can’t accept it ourselves, it must be seen as if we’re forced to accept it by the entire Arab world. And don’t quote me on that.’

Second, the core issues between Israel and the Palestinians must have the involvement of the Arab States. You can’t solve the issue of Jerusalem without Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Morocco. You can’t solve the eastern border issue without Jordan or border security on the Gaza front without Egypt, so they must be involved. The issue of Palestinian refugees cannot be resolved without the involvement of Arab states and their willingness to fund some of the investments required.

The third reason is that Palestinians and Israelis don’t trust each other but they trust the Arab states – the Israelis more than ever before. A commitment from Arab states to the future of Palestine and building it as a model state is clearly something that could help.
The fourth is very simple. A Palestinian demilitarised state has very little to offer Israel in terms of strategic regional security, which could only evolve out of a regional security alliance led by key Arab States and Israel. We are proposing a very different paradigm whereby concessions to the Palestinians are met by cooperation with the Arab world. It’s no longer just this zero-sum game between Israel and the Palestinians.

Last but not least, if there is an agreement, there will be a huge effort by spoilers to derail it. This could be Hamas, internal extremists in the PA, regional forces or even Israelis. We don’t know. The only people who could take care of these threats and secure the Israeli–Palestinian agreement from being derailed – like what happened with the Oslo Accords – are the Arab states.

Many people say religion is a source of conflict. Why do you argue it can be a source of peace?

Michael Melchior: First of all, religion is probably the biggest NGO in the world. It is the biggest component of identity for a great many people and it connects those people to tradition, history, culture and ethnicity. And at the centre is God. Religion plays many different roles – it soothes lives, heals and can provide redemption, but it can also separate people, causing war, hatred and racism.

We know that religion plays a major role in many conflicts. It is often used by the protagonists as one of the ‘reasons’ for conflict. And this leads many people – especially in the Western world – to suggest taking God out of the equation, in order to get on better with conflict resolution and with what they see as the ‘real’ issues. But the world doesn’t work that way. God is very much inside the equation; God is one of the real issues.

What the Israeli–Palestinian peacemakers decided to do was to take religion out of the equation. They wanted a quick fix peace agreement that would deal with certain aspects of the conflict, leaving the existential aspects to be dealt with later. This was attempted in Oslo, Camp David, Annapolis, in George W. Bush’s Road Map, and during the aborted John Kerry-led talks. It has been like going down a blind alley with four flat tyres. The first time around one could say that we didn’t know it was a blind alley. But we should have learned from experience and analysed what went wrong. Why didn’t we succeed? I think everybody will agree that the religious factor was the main thing which blew up the Oslo Accords.

When Oslo was signed I was afraid it would fail because it excluded the religious aspects of the conflict, and the religious leaders themselves. And that is what happened: on both sides it was these excluded groups who blew up the conflict.

If I was at the start of a negotiation and I said to you, ‘You’ve been doing this your whole life: tell me five things that I should do to succeed’, how would you reply?

Yair Hirschfeld: First, I’d tell you that you need a concept of mutual trust-building. Second,
you should define what you already agree on. For example, on territory and security we agree on more than 70 per cent. So put down in an agreement what you agree upon and you use this in order to implement trust-building. Third, where there is agreement, implement. Fourth, work on bridging proposals on what you don’t agree upon. While you’re implementing, while you’re getting trust, while you’re getting legitimacy, while you’re moving forward on a two-state solution, while you’re building relations with third parties, while you’re fighting together against terror, while you’re creating a better atmosphere; work on bridging proposals. There are all kinds of innovative ideas on bridging proposals.

And I would tell you that it is important to ask the right questions. The question is not ‘what is the solution?’ The right questions are, ‘Do we want a two-state solution? How do I build a strong and effective and continuous Palestinian state? How do I build a strong Jewish and democratic state with equal civilian rights for all citizens? And how do I combine this with both sides recognising that Israel is the homeland of the Jewish people and Palestine the homeland of the Palestinian people.’

Fifth, you have to have agreement about how third parties can help you to implement what you’ve agreed upon, and how they can help you deal with the outstanding issues.

If you do all five, you have a package that can work.

What is the Palestinian strategy to achieve the two-state solution?

Husam Zomlot: To redefine the relationship with Israel and to focus on pressure points for change. Fatah is the biggest movement in the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), and has responsibilities: to reinstate a functioning political system, to lead a democratic renewal, and to seriously think about how to end occupation and fulfil Palestinian historic rights. We have to be patient, adopt a long term perspective and understand that there is no ‘knockout’ blow available to end the occupation. It will be a cumulative process, incremental and constructive.

The battle is not going to be won via military engagement. ‘Popular resistance’ however, can succeed; peaceful, non-violent resistance. By engaging the occupation in a popular and peaceful way, this strategy retains the moral high ground and maximises international support for the Palestinians.

But this long term strategy is also realistic. Everywhere, public opinion is shifting. At a speaking engagement in the US recently, I learned how the younger generation of American Jews are changing their identity and have a very different relationship with Israel than their parents and grandparents had.

The biggest battle Palestinians face is, in a word, staying. Standing steadfast is not easy. For example, the PLO negotiation department recently arranged a tour of diplomats and media to the E1 area between East Jerusalem and Ma’ale Adumim, to inspect the settlement plan, and even
I was shocked by what is happening there. The E1 plan is an Israeli plan to settle in a stretch of the West Bank from East Jerusalem to Jericho, cutting the future Palestinian state in two. The US opposes it strongly. And yet that plan is unfolding.

For the last 22 years we have been thinking that ending the occupation is a Palestinian– Israeli responsibility. We need fresh thinking: building a functioning political system, building a viable and sustainable Palestinian economy, and staying on the land; all that is our responsibility. But ending the occupation is now also an international responsibility.

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THE OLD WAYS HAVE HAD THEIR DAY. PEACE-MAKING WILL LOOK VERY DIFFERENT IN THE ERA OF TRUMP

CLAIRE SPENCER

Claire Spencer is Senior Research Fellow at the Middle East and North Africa Programme and Second Century Initiative, Chatham House. In this reflection on the likely impact of the US election on the Middle East Peace Process she suggests the old ways of negotiating, pretending to negotiate, and stalling over vested interests have well and truly had their day. If Trump engages (and his intentions remain unclear), this businessman will likely rewrite the rules of the ‘peace process’. Everyone will need to adapt very quickly. (Extract)

President-elect Trump has been surprisingly upbeat about what he calls ‘the ultimate deal’. But this does not mean that reviving a peace process will be a priority for him. Last year, candidate Trump said, ‘A lot will have to do with Israel and whether or not Israel wants to make the deal — whether or not Israel’s willing to sacrifice certain things.’ He added: ‘That may not be OK, and I understand that, and I’m OK with that, but then you’re just not going to have a deal.’ Since his election, he told Israel Hayom that ‘I believe that my administration can play a significant role in helping the parties to achieve a just, lasting peace,’ without spelling out what that role might be. Early post-election statements from his campaign team advisers Walid Phares and Jason Dov Greenblatt have already set some of the parameters: Israeli settlements are not an obstacle; the US Embassy will move to Jerusalem, but ‘under consensus’; the incoming president ‘will make it a priority if the Israelis and Palestinians want to make it a priority’, but will not ‘force peace upon them, it will have to come from them.’ In an interview with the Wall Street Journal published on 10 November, Trump himself said: ‘(a)s a deal maker, I’d like to do… the deal that can’t be made.

One thing is known: he is a businessman and has a businessman’s approach to doing deals, which successful or otherwise over the course of a long career, is something he prides himself on being good at. The region’s political establishments may dismiss his inexperience in the finer details of peace-making at their peril; he is likely to have little patience for bureaucratic red tape, procedural issues and received wisdoms about how things should be done – and this will disconnect the ‘peace specialist’ industry as much as it could potentially shake others out of their lethargy. He may surprise, precisely because he cannot be cornered by any previous track record; apparently naïve questioning and approaches may prove to be just the opposite: they might equally serve to dismiss and side-step all the disputed language, interpretations and precedents that have accumulated like layers on a cake since the 1993 handshake on the White House lawn.
If he does get involved, he is likely to show more of an interest in the economic incentives on both sides, and explore the Netanyahu government’s enthusiasm for a regional deal with Trump’s own business partners in the Gulf. That he would do this entirely at the expense of the Palestinians and their exclusion from the benefits of a regional deal, cannot be taken for granted. If the Palestinian Authority were wise, they would be fielding a delegation of the brightest and best of the new generation of young Palestinian entrepreneurs to New York ahead of January 2017 to make the point that trade, investment and jobs in the West Bank and Gaza need a solid national political framework for anything beyond charitable hand-outs to work, not just concessions from the Israelis. But they probably won’t. What the current Palestinian leadership still needs to understand is that a rights-based, UN-resolution-based approach to peace-making is unlikely to cut any mustard with a Trump administration.

He could lose patience with intransigence and immutable principles, and any kind of preconditions to sitting down and doing a deal. He could take one look at the complexities and walk away, delegating the task to an envoy, or whoever replaces John Kerry. He may stick to his word and deprioritise the issue until and unless a bilateral process takes shape. In the event, both Israelis and Palestinians may find themselves pressured to find some new faces to ‘do the deal’ based on concrete interests rather than legal or historical precedents or appeals to narrowly-based security interests. The result, in an ideal world, could be that the impossible suddenly becomes possible – not because the leg-work of persuading majority opinions on each side that a two-state solution is the least worst outcome (public opinion already reflects this to be the case) but that the old ways of negotiating, pretending to negotiate, and stalling over vested interests and impossible compromises have well and truly had their day.

For the younger generations on both sides of the argument, this could encourage an entirely different way of thinking about a shared future. To get this far, however, will require new leaders on both sides and a kind of Trump-sized grassroots and business community rebellion against their respective political establishments. Since the world is less than ideal, this is not going to happen. But stranger things in the new world of Trump can at least be imagined.

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WE ARE WEAK BECAUSE THERE IS NO PALESTINIAN NON-VIOLENT MOVEMENT

ALI ABU AWAD

Ali Abu Awwad is a leading Palestinian activist and the founder of Roots – an Israeli-Palestinian project in the West Bank that works for co-existence by changing peoples’ narratives and by transforming the relationship between the two peoples. He sat with Fathom deputy editor Calev Ben-Dor to discuss imprisonment, bereavement, and the missing Palestinian non-violent movement. (Extract)

One year after my brother’s death my mother hosted a group of bereaved Israeli parents – the Parents Circle Family Forum. I found it shocking to see my mother speaking to Israelis, and I was astounded that they came to my home unarmed to pay a condolence visit. It was even shocking to see an Israeli crying – I could never imagine Jewish people had tears. Yet suddenly they had a human face. It struck me that if the people who paid the highest price can respect me and understand my rights then anyone can. This transformed my life.

I began a complex, painful journey in non-violence and reconciliation, touring almost 40 countries and speaking out in order to bring this message. But I also realised it was essential to create a national Palestinian non-violent movement that would ensure two things: that we could resist occupation non-violently, but that we would stop being victims and begging others to help us. I believe this first step has to come from us. This doesn’t mean Israel isn’t guilty or that we are angels. But we have to create a place where we will no longer be prisoners of the anger that this situation creates every day. We must escape the prison of our narrative.

Along with many other activists, ex-prisoners, women and youth, I created the Taghyeer movement, which means ‘change’ in English. My aim was to show people that they can develop themselves without waiting for others. We have visited communities and engaged community leaders in order to create the mass movement that will guarantee enough pressure on politicians of both sides.

Calev Ben-Dor: What does Roots seek to achieve?

Ali Abu Awwad: Encourage people to take responsibility. If a mosque is burned, are Jews ready to say this is not Judaism? If a Palestinian stabs a woman, are Palestinians ready stand up and say this act doesn’t represent them? People need to be strong enough to make statements, because we don’t see it from politicians.
In addition to encouraging the grassroots, we also aim to put pressure on the political leadership to stop using excuses like ‘security’ or ‘freedom’. But this won’t happen unless the two sides stand together and speak in one voice.

But our role is not to dialogue forever. Dialogue is only a carrier from truth to a bigger truth. The bigger truth is what we need to do for peace: not only building a non-violent identity, but creating a mass movement on the ground – where hundreds of thousands of people will come onto the street to force the political leadership to sit and find a solution that we will all benefit from.

CB-D: In Roots you partner with Jewish settlers. What is that like?

AAA: I came here two and half years ago to create a Palestinian non-violent centre in an area surrounded by settlements. Many people thought I had lost my mind. But I’m tired of the Israeli lefties in the peace movement. The Israeli peace movement is stuck. The Israelis would tell me that as good Jews they don’t drive to the occupied territories, or speak to settlers. But what good does that do me? I suffer here and I want to partner with Israelis here, not at the beach in Tel Aviv or at five star peace conferences. There, they won’t speak about the Dheisheh refugee camp in Bethlehem where people don’t have water. When Israelis don’t speak to settlers they are evading their responsibility. When I came here and began speaking to settlers I found out that my job as a Palestinian is to bring lefties from Tel Aviv to meet settlers in Efrat.

I’m not seeking to give legitimacy to settlements but to the human beings who have roots in this land. This is the painful part of this solution where both sides need to recognise the legitimate narratives that both nations have about this land. One can’t separate five million refugees from their roots and expect a solution. Nor can one divide 700,000 settlers from their roots and expect a solution. On the other hand, we can’t live together.

Read the full interview at http://fathomjournal.org/
I was asked to talk about what President-elect Trump’s policy will be in the Middle East, but I should start by saying I don’t have a clue! The idea that anybody knows exactly what he’ll do in the Middle East as President reflects a kind of hubris, and what is called for is a kind of humility. What I’d rather do is set the context that he is going to face, because reality has a way of imposing itself.

When Trump becomes President, he will face a more challenging Middle East than any other President. He’s going to inherit a war in Syria that has produced half a million dead and 12m refugees; he will likely inherit a situation where the eastern part of Aleppo will be either depopulated or the Syrian regime will be in control and heavily dependent on Shia militias. Al-Raqqa in Syria will still be under ISIS control but it will be under assault. The Syrian conflict is a war against Bashar al-Assad and it’s also a war among the opposition groups against ISIS. If Syria was the only thing he was inheriting, it would be more than enough for one administration.

But President-elect Trump doesn’t face just this threat in Syria. He also faces the situation in Iraq where, shortly after he becomes President, Mosul is likely to be rid of ISIS, or at least the visible parts of ISIS. Here again, what will happen in the aftermath? Will there be Sunni governance and inclusion? Or will we see a reoccurrence of what happened in Fallujah or Ramadi, where the town was taken over by Shia militias and young Sunni males ‘disappeared,’ thus reconstructing the circumstances which helped create ISIS in the first place?

Together or individually, Syria and Iraq would be huge challenges for any incoming administration and his administration gets to deal with both. But there is more.

There is the proxy conflict in Yemen between the Saudis and the Iranians. The Iranians are sending weapons and have an interest in bleeding the Saudis there. The Saudis have an interest in not having the equivalent of Hezbollah on its border. I don’t see that conflict going away any time soon.
And there is Egypt, a country of 93m people which just got an International Monetary Fund loan and has a shortage of rice, sugar and cooking oil. We cannot afford for Egypt to become a failed state. If you think the reality of the Syrian civil war created new challenges for Europe – it certainly created new strains within the European community – imagine what would happen if there is no response to Egypt that stems the potential for it to become a failed state. It may dwarf the consequences of what’s happening in Syria and the implications it has already had. That’s also something the next administration will have to confront.

In addition to all these issues, in the region Iran is using Shia militias as a tool against Sunni Arab governments. So it isn’t only ISIS that threatens the Arab state structure, but also the actions of Iran via its Shia militias. It’s one thing for Trump to say that he will deal with Iran and the nuclear deal. But how he chooses to deal with Syria has implications for how he deals with the larger question of the challenges posed by Iran and its use of Shia militias.

All of that is taking place against the challenges to state structures in the region and struggle over identity. It’s a backdrop that looks pretty daunting to say the least. Against that backdrop I would identify two assets.

One is the convergence of strategic interests between Israel and the Sunni Arab states. While that convergence has not revealed itself in dramatic, public, tangible forms of cooperation, what we do see is that there are very practical points of cooperation below the radar. It’s very difficult to see a traditional model of strictly bilateral negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians producing anything substantial. The Palestinians are too weak and divided, not to mention that if they were at the table they couldn’t make any concessions. But maybe with Arab cover something becomes possible. The same is true for Israel. Because Israelis feel that if they want to gain something from concessions it will be through Arab states rather than Palestinians.

There is a very interesting potential transformation – economically, politically and socially – taking place in Saudi Arabia. I was there in August and saw the entire Saudi leadership. One leader said to me: ‘Welcome to our revolution described as economic reform.’ Obviously it won’t be a linear progression, and there are very real sources of opposition to it, but the fact is we have a real stake in its success.

There has never been a successful model of development or modernisation in the Arab world. Since Gamal Abdel Nasser’s time there have been several pretenders, including secularists and Islamists, who have claimed that they will restore a greatness that has been lost. But none of them could because they didn’t have a practical approach to reconcile modernity with Islam. But here in Saudi Arabia we now see an attempt to do that.

If the new administration recognises both the nature of these daunting problems and how these assets can be utilised to contend with the wider array of issues then that is a positive. Whether or not it will, remains to be seen.

Read the transcript of the entire panel discussion at http://fathomjournal.org/
What are the grounds for arguing that although the deal is weak and seriously flawed, it would nevertheless be unwise for the Trump administration to scrap it? First, such a step would cause unnecessary friction with the other P5+1 (US, Russia, China, France, UK and Germany) partners, who have decided to accept the deal, ignore its problematic aspects, and move forward with economic – and for some military – deals with Iran. The EU advocates that the deal should continue to serve as a platform for building trust between the EU and Iran, even though Iran has displayed little if anything by way of trust-building throughout the negotiation process, and in the 18 months since the deal was reached.

Second, a year and a half into the deal – and a year into its implementation – changed realities require new calculations. Iran has already pocketed a significant amount of money – billions of dollars, some in hard cash – and has increased oil exports, so ditching the deal now would mean letting Iran off the hook with its nuclear obligations after Iran has gained much of the sanctions relief it was seeking (despite the complaints of the Supreme Leader). The US would be left with little leverage to improve the situation. In fact, it would have to again try to build up the kind of pressure that Iran faced on the eve of the 2013 negotiation, which took a tremendous amount of time and energy.

Finally, there is much that can be done to improve the circumstances surrounding the deal, without renouncing or renegotiating it. Indeed, an outright rejection of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) would only provide a convenient platform for deal supporters to shift blame for all the ills that will follow, from the Obama administration to the Trump presidency.

An important initial step that the Trump administration should take is to state clearly and publicly that Iran violated the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for decades, while working on a military nuclear programme. All that is required in this regard is a change of rhetoric, because the conclusion that Iran advanced a military nuclear programme has already been reached by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Indeed, the definitive IAEA report on the question of what is known as the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of Iran’s programme was issued in December 2015. According to the report, Iran worked on a military programme until 2003, and in a less coordinated manner until at least 2009. Significantly, the IAEA could not say anything more conclusive than this because even after the JCPOA was announced in mid-July 2015, Iran refused to cooperate with the IAEA’s investigation into the PMD, which it had to conclude by December 2015. And even with partial cooperation, the conclusion is damning.

But once the report was released, it was immediately and inexplicably shelved; there was no further discussion of the matter, and Iran’s lack of cooperation with the IAEA investigation was ignored. The P5+1 moved on to Implementation Day (mid-January 2016) as if the report had never been issued.

This policy needs to change. Publicly clarifying Iran’s problematic past is critical because Iran denies it ever worked on a military nuclear programme, and has clung to its narrative of nuclear innocence, unchallenged by the P5+1. Declaring that Iran is a violator of the NPT is a necessary precondition for demanding clarifications regarding other issues stemming from the deal – three of which deserve special mention. The first goes to the confidentiality that Iran seems to have been granted in some of its dealings with the IAEA, that we only learned about over the course of 2015 and 2016. The issue was first exposed regarding the inspection carried out at Parchin (a military site) in September 2015, and in mid-2016 it cropped up again following media reports on Iran’s enrichment plans for year 11 of the deal. These confidentiality privileges were explained by the P5+1 as normal procedure between the IAEA and NPT member states. But Iran is obviously not a normal member of the NPT and should not enjoy such privileges – it is a violator of the treaty, and has not cooperated with the IAEA in its investigations. There is no justification for granting confidentiality, which clearly works in Iran’s favour.

Read the full article at http://fathomjournal.org/
WHERE IS SYRIA GOING?

JONATHAN SPYER

Syria has been a divided country since the summer of 2012. There are four actors, each with a sphere in which they hold power – the Assad regime, the Sunni-Arab rebellion, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and Syrian Democratic Union Party (PYD).

The Syrian civil war has become a fusion of seven entwined conflicts. First, the conflict that gave birth to all the others, between the Assad regime and the Sunni-Arab rebels; second, the conflict between the regime and ISIS in central Syria; third, the rebels against ISIS in north-west Syria; fourth, the Kurds against ISIS in northern Raqqa province; fifth, the Kurds against Assad in northern Syria; sixth, the Kurds versus the Sunni-Arab rebels in the north-western part of the country at the isolated Afrin enclave; and seven, Sunni-Arab rebels against Sunni-Arab rebels, specifically in the area east of Damascus between two rebel groups: Liwa al-Islam and Fariq al-Rahman.

The road to fragmentation took its first major turn in the summer of 2012 when the Assad regime unilaterally withdrew from a large section of the north and east of the country. Thereafter, Syria divided into three areas: the Assad regime area, consisting of the capital of Damascus, the coastal area and Aleppo; three enclaves controlled by the Kurds, who later united two of the enclaves; and the remaining area controlled by the largely Sunni-Arab rebellion.

The map has remained more or the less the same since mid-2012 with some subsequent variations. Over this period 300,000 people have lost their lives either fighting or being victim to the fighting, but the dynamic of the war has stayed the same: a division into separate enclaves, largely defined by sectarianism.

The Assad regime has benefited from two salient factors which have ensured its survival. First, it has found very reliable and supportive allies in Russia and the Islamic Republic of Iran. And second, Assad has benefited from the relative cohesion and loyalty of the absolute inner circle
of his regime. As a result of these factors, Assad’s rule is not under threat, but he’s not strong to reverse the situation back to the status quo antebellum.

Regarding the Sunni-Arab rebellion, its greatest drawback has been the absence of unity – the inability to develop a single, authoritative political leadership to control the military forces on the ground.

The Kurdish sphere, under the tutelage of the PYD, consists of two enclaves: Afrin in the northwest and Rojava in the east of Syria. These two enclaves represent a single contiguous area of Kurdish control, stretching all the way from the Iraq-Iran border to several hundred kilometres into Syria, internally divided by different Kurdish nationalities. I last visited this area four months ago and experienced a tightly governed space, able to restrain any threat to its rule (except for two regime-controlled areas in the towns Hasakah and Qamishli).

The fastest growing sphere in 2014-5 was the ISIS sphere, but that is now the sphere losing the most ground. It has lost between 25 to 30 per cent of the territory it once controlled in Syria.

Where does Israel fit in all of this? Israel miscalculated about Assad’s imminent downfall in 2012. Although this analysis was wrong, it was part of a wider misjudgement of the realities on the ground. Post-2012 Israeli analysis is divided between those who think that the rebels should win because their victory would deal a greater blow to the Iranians, and those who think a victory for a weakened Assad will be better for Israel, because he is ‘the devil we know’.

There are two reasons to intervene at some level in Syria: control of the area adjacent to the Golan Heights; and the prevention of sophisticated weapon transfers to Hezbollah in Lebanon. It is clear that Israel prefers the rebels not the regime to have control east of the Golan Heights. The other threat to Israel is the transfer of weapon systems to Hezbollah. Despite large amounts of Israeli military action over the skies of Syrian to prevent such transfers, we won’t know how successful Israel has been until there is another war between Hezbollah and Israel – if we know what Hezbollah is using, then we will know how successful Israel was in preventing such transfers. Israeli diplomacy vis-à-vis Russia has been successful, ensuring that Israeli air patrols can continue unabated over Syria.

Read the full round table discussion at http://fathomjournal.org/
Shiraz Maher is the author of Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea (Hurst, 2016) and Deputy Director at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation at King’s College London. His mapping of contemporary Salafi-Jihadism was presented to a Fathom Forum on 28 July 2016 and ranged over the three forms it takes today (quietist, reformist, jihadist), its non-normative interpretation of the foundational concepts of Jihad, Takfir, Tawhid, al-wala wal-bar, and al-hakimiyya, and the origins of contemporary Salafi-jihadism in the post 9/11 conjuncture. Maher also responded to questions from policy-makers and opinion formers. (Extract)

**Question:** What makes a person move from being a supporter of the ideas of IS to taking the matters into their own hands? How does that work?

**Shiraz Maher:** Even within Salafi-Jihadi circles, to go to the IS position is still much disputed. For all of its barbarism and nihilism, Al-Qaeda still had scholars within it. The learned people within its ranks weren’t necessarily operational, but they were part of the ecosystem of Salafi-Jihadi thought. People like Abu Qatada, Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi, or Abu Basir al-Tartusi. For them, IS has gone well beyond the pale. They refer to IS as khawarij. It’s a very loaded terminology that, to describe a movement like IS as khawarij. So, even if you’re quite a radical Salafi who is jihadi inclined in the West, there is this body of opinion that you respect that is pushing you away. That’s why the people who are going in to IS seem to come from this more stop-start position. It is harder to radicalise people who are already established in one religious tradition because they have counter-arguments. It is easier to get someone who is a blank canvas and suck them in.

How is this then translated into action – like the beheading of a priest for example? Well, one of the things we’ve come to understand in the last few months is that terrorism doesn’t have to be very sophisticated. In the past, if I was a young man in Bradford, who was into Jihad and something like 7/7 happens and I think this is a great act, and I want to emulate it, it’s not so easy. I have to go recruit people. I have to learn how to build a bomb. There are all these barriers – technical as well as emotional, that may stop me getting to the point of action. What has been so clearly demonstrated is that now you can just go get a knife, or hire a truck, to wreak havoc and devastation. It’s the simplification of terrorism. Getting your car and ramming someone has been well established in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for a long time, but it had not yet translated
into Europe. Unfortunately, I think we’re well into it now in Europe, mainly because of the demonstration of success by these people who rely on their lack of sophistication.

Question: Is there a place for the theological community to dissuade people before they make that jump, to play more of an outward-facing role?

SM: Theology does play a role. It is important to tackle the ideas, even though not every person on the ground understands them. But there is also a need to push IS back now. What gives ideas their traction is success and momentum. IS has momentum so for a time we will watch the flow of foreign fighters from Europe going into the conflict in Syria. You can see these spikes in recruitment after dramatic moments like the capture of Mosul, or the declaration of a caliphate. That was a really unique moment: it was so brazen to see him do that. I remember being at the BBC discussing it with Abu Rumaysah and I said, ‘If you believe in it, why don’t you go?’ And about 10 days later he turned up in Syria! That guy did actually walk the walk. He thought, ‘If I believe in all this, then I have to go.’ I think this was true for many people who went. So the way to defeat the idea is to crush IS.

What I find staggering, is that when I talk to the Europeans who have gone out to fight they say about Qatada, Maqdisi, ‘these guys have gone soft, they have sold out’. They are no longer hard-core enough for them! And this is because they think they are standing with a movement that has success and momentum. So we can crush the idea by crushing its physical manifestation.

Question: What messaging is effective in preventing recruitment?

SM: Once they’re out there, it’s all too late. What provokes them to think again? Not the horrific treatment of the Yazidis. None of that really matters to them. Killing other Sunni Muslims does though. Some of them think, hang on, I came here to fight Bashar al-Assad. What prompted the returnees to start to disengage and leave was when suddenly they were killing other Sunni Muslims. Unfortunately, not much else seems to matter. You can rape Yazidis and they won’t think twice, but killing other Sunni Muslims is what gets them.

Read the full round table discussion at http://fathomjournal.org/
Fathom’s contributing editor Dr. Toby Greene sat down with Jonathan Rynhold, professor of Political Science at Bar Ilan University, and discussed the implications of Brexit for Israel’s relations with the UK and the European Union. (Extract)

Toby Greene: Britain’s Ambassador to Israel, David Quarrey, has (unsurprisingly) tried to talk up the positives of the UK leaving the EU from an Israeli perspective, suggesting the bilateral relationship between Israel and the UK can only become more significant. Is that spin or is there something substantial in his argument?

Jonathan Rynhold: I think there is something substantial. The UK-Israel relationship is stronger in terms of political, diplomatic and military cooperation than is the multilateral relationship between the EU and Israel. The UK has been less antagonistic (or more sympathetic) to Israel’s security concerns since Tony Blair, and all prime ministers since have taken the same position, viewing Israel and the UK’s security as linked. That’s clear on the bilateral path, but when it goes multilateral, support for Israel becomes something that is negotiated away because there are other immediate priorities. For example, if the prime minister might want his/her associate to be the EU commissioner and the price for that is agreeing to something else on Israel, Israel is not the UK’s priority. So that factor will be removed.

A second point is that the UK will become incentivised to look for economic partners outside of the EU. And while there is a political problem for Israel with the public, associated with the civil society Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement, in economic terms there is not a problem. The economic relationship with Israel has increased over the last decade. There’s more scientific cooperation, more trade, and the UK may be required to look to Israel for greater cooperation, particularly with the uncertain economic situation surrounding Brexit. So both politically and economically it is likely that the relationship will improve a bit, but it’s not as if the EU is the major factor.

TG: So, if the EU was not a massive drag on the British-Israeli relationship in the first place, removing the EU from the picture is not going to make a transformative difference – maybe just remove one possible constraint on the relationship?

JR: The negative side to Brexit is that Britain will not be promoting a position that is more
sensitive to Israeli security concerns and positions at the negotiating table in the EU. Former Prime Minister David Cameron’s speech in the Knesset during the 2014 John Kerry negotiations was one of the first times that a British prime minister had spoken in detail of Israel’s security requirements. Normally what happens is that the EU details what the Palestinians needs are, i.e. 1967 borders, East Jerusalem as its capital, a solution to the refugee problem. It adds that of course Israel should have security, but rarely offers any detail. David Cameron, however, detailed the Jordan Valley, mentioned demilitarised zones, and mentioned recognition of a Jewish state. That voice will no longer be in the EU – that is a net loss for Israel. However, the UK still has a seat at the UNSC and will be freer to act, so it’s a mixed picture.

The key is to realise that UK-Israel relations and UK policy towards Israel are not driven by the membership or non-membership of the EU. What drives it are a number of things: economics, which we have spoken about; but also the strategic question of ‘What is the source of instability in the Middle East?’ There are certain people in the UK who argue that if you resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, then the Middle East would cease to be unstable, anti-western – sometimes known as the ‘linkage view’. There are also those who argue the other side: that of course it would be help tensions in the Middle East if we could resolve the Israeli-Arab conflict, but larger problems such as youth unemployment, lack of education, political extremism, poverty, and sectarianism are intrinsic to the Middle East. The people who subscribe to the second view tend to be more pro-Israel, whilst the people who take the first view tend to be more anti-Israel. What we have seen over the last five to six years in the Middle East has strengthened the second view, as it became more difficult to advance the argument that Israel has anything to do with the problems in Libya, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Syria.

Read the full interview at http://fathomjournal.org/
2017 is the hundredth anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, the British government’s letter of support for the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Toby Greene argues that Britain should use the spotlight to promote a positive vision for the future, using a vocabulary that is sensitive to the conflicting emotions on both sides of the dispute, and ‘it’s best endeavours’ to improve the chances of the pragmatists who recognise that two national homes is the only way to reconcile the demands of two nations, and end a century of conflict. (Extract)

For Jews, the Balfour Declaration is part of its narrative of salvation. Simply put, hundreds of thousands of Jews who fled from Europe to Palestine in the 1920s and 1930s, and their descendants, owe their lives to it. The family members they left behind perished in the Shoah (Holocaust). For Jews it is the 1939 White Paper, in which Britain cancelled its commitment to a Jewish national home, all but halted Jewish immigration, and closed off one of the last escape routes from the Europe, that is the mark of British betrayal and shame. These events touched most Jewish families in Britain in one way or another.

Not only did the creation of the Jewish national home provide a refuge for hundreds of thousands of Jews before the war, but it enabled the establishment of the State of Israel after the war. For Jews, Israel’s establishment – restoring Jewish sovereignty in what Jews consider their historic homeland – was the anti-Shoah, giving Jewish identity a positive future.

By understanding this, it can it be appreciated how clankingly offensive the demands for Britain to apologise for the Balfour Declaration are for Jews. Though perhaps understandable from Palestinians, from others it reflects a conspicuous disdain for Jewish sensitivities and Jewish history. It is no surprise that a recent Parliamentary event launching a ‘Balfour Apology Campaign’ became a shameful forum for antisemitic bluster.

That said, everyone who cares about Israel must also recognise that the process that created the State of Israel – the Jewish narrative of salvation – is for Palestinians their narrative of catastrophe, or ‘Nakba’. The extent to which the declaration is responsible for their loss is open to historical debate, but the loss and suffering of the Palestinian people is undeniable.

This is the minefield that Britain must navigate, and a notable gap has already emerged between Number 10 and the Foreign Office. May’s commitment to mark the anniversary with pride...
jars with the position taken by Middle East Minister Tobias Elwood in a recent Parliamentary debate, in which he declared that Britain will mark the centenary, but ‘will neither celebrate nor apologise’.

Certainly the answer for British representatives is not to attempt to retrospectively rewrite the Balfour Declaration, as Elwood awkwardly appeared to do in that debate, stating that the Balfour Declaration should have asserted the political (rather than only civil and religious) rights of the non-Jewish communities in Palestine.

Redrafting a century-old letter to assuage today’s political sensitivities can only distort the historical picture. Rather than rewrite the past, Britain should use the spotlight to increase understanding of it, and promote a positive vision for the future, using a vocabulary that is sensitive to the conflicting emotions on both sides of the dispute.

Britain should take the opportunity of the spotlight to speak about the future. The Balfour Declaration was a statement of aspiration. It declared what Britain viewed with favour, and what it would use its best endeavours to bring about. What should Britain view with favour today?

Firstly, that with Israel’s establishment, centuries of Jewish homelessness and persecution have ended; that Israel is democratic, affirms the rights of non-Jewish citizens, and is an extraordinary engine for creativity; and that it has a fruitful relationship with Britain based on shared interests and values.

But Britain should also view with favour – indeed reaffirm with vigour – the urgency of establishing a Palestinian state that would afford long overdue self-determination, due dignity, and economic and political opportunity to the Palestinian people.

Read the full article at http://fathomjournal.org/

JEFFREY HERF

Jeffrey Herf is Distinguished Professor of History at the University of Maryland. His books include Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World, The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda during World War II and the Holocaust, Divided Memory: the Nazi Past and the Two Germanys, and Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich. He spoke to Fathom editor Alan Johnson about his new book Undeclared Wars with Israel: East Germany and the West German Far Left 1967-81. (Extract)

Alan Johnson: Let’s turn to other focus of the book which is the role of the West German far-left in the undeclared war on Israel. Tell us about these leftists?

Jeffrey Herf: They came from the Baader-Meinhof Group and Revolutionary Cells, who worked closely with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Both groups emerged from what is termed ‘the 1960’s New Left’. In the 1970s, terrorism originating on the fringe of this left was unprecedented in terms of the number of attacks and the level of sophistication. One of the most stunning events of this period was the hijacking of an Air France flight to Entebbe in Uganda. The people who hijacked the flight were members of the PFLP and two members of the Frankfurt far-left, Wilfried Böse and Brigitte Kuhlmann. Joschka Fischer, the German foreign minister in the 1990s, knew Wilfried Böse and Kuhlman very well. At Entebbe these two pointed their machine guns at the hostages, and separated the Jews and the Israelis from the non-Jews and non-Israelis – who were released. And Entebbe was an operation conducted with the collaboration and cooperation of Idi Amin, the then-president of Uganda. Amin was infamous for celebrating Hitler in the aftermath of the Munich attacks at the 1972 Olympics – he also celebrated the Holocaust. At Entebbe, two young West German leftists who opposed fascism and Nazism at home, collaborating with a man for whom Hitler was a hero. It’s an astonishing story.

I think Entebbe was one of the key moments when the distinction between anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism vanished. This was an anti-Semitic act. There was not criticism of Israeli policy, just guns being pointed at Jews and threats to kill those Jews. We spend too much time debating what is and is not anti-Semitism.

AJ: One of the most interesting things in the book is how you reconstruct – from a multitude of archives – the experiences and the views of the Jewish people who were the targets of this undeclared war.
JH: I decided to recreate their experiences because I felt it was an important part of the history. I was influenced by how Saul Friedländer had reconstructed the Holocaust. I wanted the Jews to be heard. Sometimes we don’t pay attention to what those targeted by antisemitism have to say. For example, Heinz Galinski and his colleagues at the Central Council of Jews in Germany were receiving death threats whilst ensuring that the children in the kindergartens and day-care centres were safe from attack. When you’re in a situation where you have to protect the lives of the children, then the intellectually-fine distinction between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism become completely absurd. I wanted to bring that experience out into the open. Heinz Galinski and his colleagues were very concerned about the turn of the New Left against Israel on university campuses. They regarded themselves as centre-left and were looking in horror at far-leftists committed to attacking Israel. They tried to understand why leftists in West Germany, trying to come to terms with Germany’s past, had taken this turn. Fortunately, they left behind many articles and essays which I drew on in the book.

AJ: You record ‘the intensity, voluntarism and passion’ with which these young far-Left Germans turned against Israel, and ‘aligned with its enemies’. How did you explain this passion?

JH: What amazed me most when reading the East German documents and the far-left West German documents was the absence of reservations, anguish, or doubt, and the sense of absolute moral uprightness of the far-left political leaders. I concluded that the whole undeclared war on Israel was a way for the political leaders to escape from the burdens of German history. The far-left leaders adopted the attitude, ‘We are Germans, but that’s not the Germany we have anything to answer for.’ They substituted an anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist future for their anti-Semitic past. That sense of liberation from their Nazi past was very important to them, psychologically and emotionally. François Furet warned us in his seminal book *The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century* (1999) that though Communism had indeed collapsed, ‘it was not so long ago’. We forget how recently it was that many millions of people believed deeply in international communism and global revolution to destroy capitalism and imperialism. Once you had that conviction – that all the evil in the world came from capitalism and imperialism and that Israel was part of that evil – then you deemed it necessary to justify terrorism to bring about a better world.

**Read the full Interview at [http://fathomjournal.org/](http://fathomjournal.org/)**
PERRY ANDERSON'S ANTI-ZIONISM: A CRITIQUE

MICHAEL WALZER

Perry Anderson’s long and fiercely anti-Zionist essay, ‘The House of Zion,’ was published in the November-December 2015 issue of New Left Review, the ‘flagship journal of the Western Left’. Fathom invited Shany Mor, Cary Nelson, John Strawson, Michael Walzer, Einat Wilf and Mitchell Cohen to respond to Anderson’s essay. Here is an extract from Walzer’s essay. (Extract)

There are parts of this long essay with which I entirely agree, but its steady political thrust and what I will call its persistent undertone are radically disagreeable. I was reminded reading it of an old New Yorker cartoon: two old men are sitting in their club, drinks in hand, and one of them, leaning forward in his chair, says to the other: ‘I say it’s war, Throckmorton, and I say, Let’s fight!’ I am sure that Perry Anderson doesn’t sit in a club like the one portrayed in the New Yorker, but he is definitely eager to fight – or eager for the Palestinians to fight. Whether he favours a purely political or also a military fight, violence or non-violence, is unclear. He doesn’t talk about terrorism at all, though he hints at the usual apologetic account of it (‘an explosion of frustration and despair’). His last paragraph seems to call for Arab states to threaten war against Israel (once they are in full control of their ‘strategic emplacements’). But his militancy is non-specific.

What is certain is that he has nothing but contempt for any Palestinian politician who isn’t actively engaged in ‘resistance.’ All those who hope for mutual accommodation between Jews and Palestinians, who are ready to accept a state alongside Israel and to call that the end of the conflict, who are engaged in a common struggle against terrorists and religious fanatics, who are trying to turn the Palestinian Authority into a nascent state – these are the chief villains in Anderson’s story. The sentences about them are one long angry sneer: they are ‘compliant notables,’ ‘placemen,’ ‘cost-effective surrogates for the IDF’ bloated with ‘the proceeds of collaboration.’ They work ‘hand-in-hand with the Shin Bet to hold down popular unrest on the West Bank.’ They run ‘a parasitic miniature of a rentier state’ and they aspire to be the ‘tin-pot ruler[s] of a Transkei by the Mediterranean.’ Anderson is superior to all this. He says it’s war, and he wants them to fight.

Actually, they have fought – in 1947 and 1948 against the original two-state solution (the UN partition plan), and many times since with terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians, and once, briefly, with a mass uprising, not quite non-violent but disciplined and participatory. Long ago, Leon Trotsky wrote that ‘terrorists want to make the people happy without the participation of the people,’ and this is a useful critique of Palestinian terrorists (and of many others, too).
But it isn’t a useful critique of the First Intifada, which was a popular engagement – and the only successful example of Palestinian political action. It led to the Oslo Accords, of which Anderson, of course, is contemptuous. Oslo is yet another example of what he calls the ‘ruinous leadership’ of the Palestinian national movement. It would only have produced that ‘Transkei by the Mediterranean.’

But, given the ruinous leadership – and I haven’t mentioned Palestinian authoritarianism, brutality, and corruption, which Anderson mostly gets right – what hope is there for any decent outcome? The situation is made even more hopeless by the character of the ‘surrounding Arab landscape… its suffocating universe of feudal autocracy and military tyranny, client regimes, and rentier states.’ Nothing will change, Anderson writes, ‘without a revolutionary transformation.’

Well, we always knew that. After the Revolution, everything will be better, indeed, absolutely better. Jews and Arabs will live in peace in one state (if there still are such things as states) and the lion will lie down with the lamb. But the Revolution, like the Messiah, isn’t immediately on the horizon. What to do until the Coming?

Anderson would like the Palestinian leaders to give up on Transkei and begin (even though it’s hopeless) a campaign for citizenship and the franchise in a single state between the Sea and the River. But this democratic solution has one odd problem: it isn’t the aspiration of the demos. ‘Neither Jews nor Palestinians have the slightest wish for it,’ says Anderson, though he immediately adds that this is more true of the Jews than of the Palestinians ‘for whom abandonment of the hope of a separate state for integration into [Greater] Israel could become preferable to indefinite asphyxiation in the status quo.’ Note the verb form, ‘could become,’ which means hasn’t yet become. For the time being, pending revolutionary and other transformations, both the Jews and the Palestinians want a state of their own. Together, they want two states.

Read the entire symposium at http://fathomjournal.org/
Why is it that what is happening to the Labour Party has caused such concern in the Jewish community? Why is it that a relatively small (compared to the size of the Party) number of cases of members and activists, most of them people nobody had even heard of, saying or writing antisemitic things on social media, has caused such upset across the Jewish community, and has been so damaging?

I think one reason is that the things that have come out from the Labour Party this year are seen by a lot of people, certainly within the Jewish community, as not being anomalies. And the reason they aren’t seeing these as anomalies is because really for the last 15 years or more, in some cases for the last 30 years, we have seen the growth of problematic, and at times downright hostile ideas of Jews, Zionism, Israel; all growing on the Left, going way beyond what might be counted as normal political criticisms and normal political language. And without really any strong opposition within the Left.

So, in recent years, it has been possible and has actually happened many times, that people can say whatever they want within the Labour Party – supporting Hamas, supporting Hezbollah, comparing Israel to Nazi Germany, talking about ‘Zionist tentacles’ and ‘Jewish cabals’ in British politics. Unless you are Gilad Atzmon, as long as you cloak what you say in the thinnest kind of anti-Israel language, you’re okay.

People have missed how much anger and upset all this was causing within the Jewish community over many years. (When one Conservative MP wears a Nazi uniform, it is outrageous and it is offensive, but it doesn’t feel like it has any further political meaning in terms of what the Conservative Party is.)

Rightly or wrongly, appearances and perceptions matter. The part of the Left that we’re talking
about, not all of the Left, just the hard Left that Corbyn has been personally associated with for so long, doesn’t really talk about, ‘get,’ or oppose modern antisemitism. If a swastika is daubed on a Jewish grave stone, the Jewish community gets all the anti-racist solidarity it wants. But when jihadists murder Jews in Paris, Toulouse and Brussels, a lot of people on the Left find it very hard to even mention antisemitism in their analysis of it.

And yet, to give one example a couple of years ago, the Institute for Race Relations brought out a report on the new antisemitism in which they said any talk of a new antisemitism coming from European Muslims is an Islamophobic campaign and allied to fascists. They even put it in the same bracket as Anders Breivik! In other words, there is a complete disconnect. Often, people think this disconnect is just about Israel. But there’s just as big a disconnect over antisemitism, and in some ways this is more important.

There just hasn’t been a sign of people on the Left really showing the necessary introspection – doing a Naz Shah basically – and really rethinking this kind of politics. Having said that, there have been some good things done by the Party. I am not one of those who says the Chakrabarti Inquiry was completely useless. It did have some good things in it; some good things about language.

But unless all this is allied to action, and unless it comes with a really detailed and concrete re-evaluation of this kind of politics that I’ve been talking about, and which has been building over many years it is always going to seem a bit superficial and a bit inauthentic.

There are people in the Party who don’t want to hear any talk about antisemitism, who see it as a threat to their political project, who argue it is all a ‘fabrication,’ it’s all a fake campaign ‘cooked up’ by a combination of Zionists and Blairites – their words, not mine. Examples of antisemitism need to be explained away, or denied, or dismissed, because they threaten their project. Now this is obviously not a way to rebuild confidence between the Party and the community. I’m not in a position to assess how influential and representative these voices are. But they are certainly loud. I think that one first step would be for very strong statements from the leadership that they don’t share these views. That, basically, these people are maybe a loud fringe, but they are not in any way speaking a language or proposing ideas that are shared in any broad way in the Party. Because if they are shared in any broad way in the Party then we’re really not going to get anywhere.

Read the full article at http://fathomjournal.org/
Jean Améry is best known in the anglophone world as a Holocaust survivor and author of ‘At The Mind’s Limits’. In the 1960s he was also the outspoken left-wing critic of left-wing antisemitism in Western Germany and it is this Améry who Marlene Gallner’s important essay makes available to us as a moral and intellectual resource today. (Extract)

When, in the 1960s, anti-Zionism grew rapidly in the German public discourse, especially within the left-wing student movement, Améry published several essays on the relationship between antisemitism and anti-Zionism. ‘Anti-Zionism contains antisemitism like a cloud contains a storm’, he wrote in the German newspaper Die Zeit. He was the first to publicly address left-wing antisemitism in Germany. Anti-Zionism was the new ‘honourable antisemitism’ that was now turned against Israel as the object of the same old and dangerous resentments. The ‘emotional infrastructure’ and the psychological mechanisms of the antisemites remained the same.

After the Shoah, Jew-hatred changed its constitution. While physical attacks on Jews still existed, and are even increasing in recent years, its most virulent form today is anti-Zionism. The new antisemite refuses to see himself as an antisemite. He proudly identifies as an anti-Zionist and thinks that thereby he has preserved his honour. But Améry points out that ‘the classical phenomenon of antisemitism takes a new shape. The old continues to exist. That is what I call co-existence’. Furthermore, he sees the new antisemitism today as more dangerous than the old, right-wing antisemitism that was and still is, easy to identify. In the 1960s Améry was reminded of National Socialist Europe: the call for the death of Jews, this time Zionists, was getting louder.

By the 1960s, left-wing antisemitism was no longer only a phenomenon of Soviet loyalists. Now it was embraced by the independent, so-called New Left. In the years immediately after the Shoah, the German public was relatively well-disposed towards the young Jewish State, though Améry believed that this was a cheap way to assuage guilt feelings. But in the 1960s, he describes how a gasp of relief could be felt in Germany in response to the rise of anti-Zionism. Finally, Germans could blame the Jews as oppressors, finally they could feel morally superior.

‘The left-wing student movement in Western Germany was a reaction against the conservatism of the previous two decades. The Auschwitz-trials in Frankfurt saw many young Germans begin to openly question the Nazi-past of the older generation, but they did not, as they should have
done, *break* with their fathers. Pacifist views spread throughout German society while at the same time popularity of the Palestinian “liberation” struggle grew. The Six-Day War, in which Israel took over the West Bank from Jordan and Gaza from Egypt, was abused as a justification to now blame Israelis as the cruel persecutors. It was a rationalisation; a welcome opportunity to utter long suppressed reflexes.’

In modern antisemitic ideology, the moral mantra of the Left – to always be on the side of the weak against the mighty – gets upended. The antisemitic delusion attributes enormous power to the Jews, and the new antisemitism repeats the delusion for Israel. While Israel is faced with annihilation at the hands of hostile neighbours that outnumber her, Israel is imagined by the Left to be an almighty oppressor and is therefore seen as its natural enemy. Améry does not euphemise the suffering of the Palestinians but stresses Israel’s fight is for survival and a ‘safe bunker for the Jews outside of Israel’.

Left-wing antisemitism pained Améry: ‘How did it come about that Marxist-dialectical thinking gives itself away to prepare the genocide of tomorrow?’ He tried to find answers. He thought there was a ‘generation problem’. The New Left was young not only on a theoretical field but also as people. Most had not witnessed the Nazi-past. Therefore, argued Améry, they failed to see what was specific to National Socialism: eliminationist antisemitism. Instead, the New Left falsely subsumed National Socialism under the heading of fascism and ignored the eliminatory antisemitism. In short, *the vast majority of the Left does not make the Shoah, the irrational extermination of Jews, a point of reference for their social theory*. They do not see the inherent threat of death carried by antisemitism and its differences to racism and other forms of group-related enmity. They view Israel as an aggressor against the Palestinian Arabs and they declare solidarity with the allegedly weak against the strong. Antisemitism in the shape of anti-Zionism becomes acceptable, or in Améry’s words ‘honourable’.

Read the full article at [http://fathomjournal.org/](http://fathomjournal.org/)
One of the most acclaimed books of 2016 was Pumpkin Flowers. The hill, in Lebanon, was called the Pumpkin; flowers was the military code word for casualties. Award-winning writer Matti Friedman re-created the harrowing experience of a band of young Israeli soldiers charged with holding this remote outpost, a task that would change them forever. (Extract)

Israel's military operations always have a name. As a mark of his achievement in June 1967, Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin was granted the honour of naming the war in which he had masterminded such a significant victory. With typical understatement, Rabin cast aside the dramatic and bombastic suggestions of his staff and named it simply ‘the Six-Day War’.

In Matti Friedman’s book, names and their absence are a recurring theme. In this powerful memoir he chronicles what he calls the forgotten war that had no name. To be precise, the intense conflict between the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon was not a new war but rather the long tail of the 1982 Lebanon War, termed ‘Operation Peace for Galilee’. What started in the 1980s as a fight against the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) morphed into something completely different. The Palestinian ‘state within a state’ was dismantled with the PLO leadership escaping to Tunis. But Israel took a grave gamble and picked a side in the civil war hoping to benefit from a future strategic alliance with Lebanon’s Christian Maronites. When the violence spiralled out of control Israel was sucked into the horror of Lebanon’s civil war. A series of disasters, massacres and miscalculations led to the ousting of Defence Minister Ariel Sharon and ultimately the resignation of Prime Minister Menachem Begin. Israel slowly redeployed south to a thin belt of Lebanese territory it named the ‘security zone’. The mission was to contain Hezbollah on Lebanese territory within a buffer zone, and thereby protect Israel’s northern border from terrorist incursions.

Israeli soldiers were positioned across the security zone in a network of hilltop bases. It is one of these bases, called ‘the pumpkin’, or ‘dlaat’ in Hebrew, to which the book owes part of its name. In an effort to distort language and sanitise a difficult situation the IDF had a penchant for code names rooted in the natural world. All the bases in southern Lebanon were named after fruits and vegetables while casualties were called ‘flowers’. This explanation early in the book only adds to the surreal story.
Friedman commands his material with great skill. He ignores the politicians and the generals and focuses at ground level on the lives of young soldiers, mere teenagers led by officers only a few years older. The story unfolds through their eyes, generating deep empathy and understanding, which is amplified when they are attacked and killed. The pace is set by events, brilliantly capturing the reality of life as a combat soldier while simultaneously managing to make the reader laugh with anecdotes of young men in their prime who, instead of having fun, are stuck in a strange land facing an adversary who desires their destruction. Time moves slowly and often their greatest enemy is mind-numbing boredom. Their lives are largely monotonous and uneventful, always preparing for an emergency through repetitive drills, which are punctuated by brief bursts of terrifying intensity.

The book has three distinct parts. Firstly, the period leading up to the tragic night when two Israeli helicopters transporting soldiers into the zone collided in mid-air killing 73 young men, an event that magnified the public pressure inside Israel to end Israel's presence in the security zone. Secondly, Friedman's personal story of living as a combat soldier in the pumpkin; and finally his fascinating mission to visit Lebanon on his Canadian passport and tour the Lebanese villages that surrounded the base, including his poignant return to the now abandoned outpost. Together these combine to create a compelling collection of memoirs eloquently describing the thoughts, feelings, ambitions, and fears of a generation of young men.

Friedman transports the reader back to a world before smartphones and social media as well as to a Middle East before 9/11, and ISIS. The soldiers he depicts are from Generation X, sons of baby boomer parents and military commanders who had a clear sense of what a real war (and victory) looked like. They were brought up on stories of heroism from the Six-Day War and Yom Kippur War, combat that included parachute drops and armoured columns whose participants were rewarded with medals. Even in the 1990s, when the book is set, the best military minds believed the real threat to Israel came from the Syrian army, and all training was focused on preparation for a full-scale war with it.

Combat in the hostile territory of southern Lebanon was looked upon simply as fighting a terror group to protect the north of Israel. While patrolling and maintaining the ‘security zone’, the soldiers had to deal with mortar fire, hidden roadside bombs, Claymore mines, Sagger missiles and ambushes. Yet these events went largely unnoticed ‘back home’ and are already forgotten by many Israelis.

Read the full review at http://fathomjournal.org/
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Dr Shiraz Maher, Senior research fellow at International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICRS), King’s College London
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Joel Braunold, executive director of the Alliance for Middle East Peace and John Lyndon, executive director of OneVoice Europe and a visiting fellow at King’s College London

*The Generational Divide among Israelis and Palestinians*

Dr Dahlia Scheindlin, a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies

*Lessons from Cyprus for Israel-Palestine: Can Negotiations Still Work?*

Dr Dalia Fadila, faculty member of the International School for Leadership and Diplomacy at IDC-Inter Disciplinary Center in Herzliya

*Q Schools: Educating for equality in Israel*
NEW IN 2016

FATHOM ISRAELI ACADEMIC SPEAKER TOURS

In 2016 Fathom launched a new project: Israeli Academic Speaker Tours.

Our first visiting academic was Professor Jonathan Rynhold, author of *The Arab-Israeli Conflict in American Political Culture* (Cambridge University Press, 2016). The book won the 2016 Israel Association for Political Science Book Prize. He is director of the Argov Center for the Study of Israel and the Jewish People and Senior Researcher at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA).

Professor Rynhold spoke at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Leeds University, the Weiner Library and the Oxford Centre for Hebrew and Israel Studies.
FATHOM ADVISORY EDITORS

DR. TAL BECKER
Israeli lead negotiator in the Annapolis talks, Fellow at the Shalom Hartman Institute and international associate of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

PAUL BERMAN
Author of Terror and Liberalism, Power and the Idealists and The Flight of the Intellectuals.

BENEDETTA BERTI
Research Fellow at INSS, a Kreitman post-doctoral fellow at Ben-Gurion University, and a member of the faculty at Tel Aviv University

GABRIEL NOAH BRAHM
Gabriel Noah Brahm is an Associate Professor of English at Northern Michigan University, and a Senior Research Fellow in Israel Studies at Brandeis University.

MARTIN BRIGHT
Former political editor of the Jewish Chronicle and a former political editor of the New Statesman. He is founder of youth employment charity The Creative Society.

SIR TREvor CHINN CVO
Vice President of the Jewish Leadership Council and member of the board of BICOM.

BEN COHEN

EFRAIM HALEVY
Director of Mossad from 1998 to 2002. Author of Man in the Shadows: Inside the Middle East Crisis with a Man who Led the Mossad.

AMOS HAREL
Military correspondent and defence analyst for Haaretz and one of Israel's leading media experts on military and defence issues.

BRIGADIER GENERAL (RES.) MICHAEL HERZOG
Former Chief of Staff to four Israeli ministers of defence and former head of the IDF's Strategic Planning Division.

DR. SARA HIRSCHHORN
University Research Lecturer and Sidney Brichko Fellow in Israel Studies, Faculty of Oriental Studies and Oxford Centre for Hebrew and Jewish Studies at the University of Oxford.

DR. DAVID HIRSH
Lecturer in Sociology at Goldsmiths, University of London. Founder of the Engage campaign against antisemitism on the UK Left.

ANTHONY JULIUS

DR. EMILY B. LANDAU
Senior Research Fellow at INSS and head of the Arms Control and Regional Security Program.

JOHN LLOYD
Senior Research Fellow, Reuters Institute, UK, and Contributing Editor, The FT.

PROFESSOR ANDREI S. MARKOVITS
Professor of Comparative Politics and German Studies at the University of Michigan.
YOSSI MEKELBERG
Associate Fellow of the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House.

DR. ALAN MENDOZA
Executive Director of the Henry Jackson Society and Director of the Israel Diaspora Trust.

SHANY MOR

JOSHUA MURAVCHIK
Joshua Muravchik is an adjunct professor at the DC-based Institute of World Politics and author of many books, including Making David Into Goliath: How the World Turned Against Israel.

PROFESSOR DONNA ROBINSON DEVINE
Professor in Jewish Studies and Professor of Government, Smith College.

ROBERT PERLMAN
Member of the board of BICOM.

GADI TAUB
Israeli author, historian, and columnist. Author of The Settlers and the Struggle over the Meaning of Zionism.

DR. JONATHAN RYNHOLD
Director of the Argov Center for Israel and the Jewish People, Bar-Ilan University and a research associate of The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.

PROFESSOR ANITA SHAPIRA
Professor Emeritas at Tel Aviv University, where she held the Ruben Merenfeld Chair for the Study of Zionism. Since 2008, she has been a Senior Fellow of the Israel Democracy Institute.

PROFESSOR ASHER SUSSER
Professor of Middle Eastern studies at Tel Aviv University and former director of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies.

DR. EINAT WILF
Einat Wilf served as a member of Knesset for the Labour Party and Independence from 2009-2013. Author of Winning the War of Words: Essays on Zionism and Israel.

PROFESSOR MICHAEL WALZER
Professor Emeritus at the Institute for Advanced Study, prominent American philosopher and public intellectual.

PROFESSOR ALEXANDER YAKOBSON
Associate Professor of Ancient History at Hebrew University and co-author of Israel and the Family of Nations: The Jewish Nation-State and Human Rights.